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  The industrialized world is littered with tens of thousands of acres of vacant, decaying, 
and often contaminated industrial and commercial sites.  These sites, commonly referred 
to as “brownfields,” scar the landscape of communities, expose citizens to possible health 
risks, deteriorate surrounding land values, and eroe the tax base of municipalities.  
Vacant and abandoned industrial sites are present in every state, but the blight associated 
with brownfields is worst in America’s “rustbelt,” the chain of once great industrial cites 
and towns stretching along historic canals and rail lines from Baltimore to Boston, and 
west to Milwaukee.  This thesis investigates federal and state brownfields policies and 
reviews contemporary brownfields literature and through a case study approach, it 
explains how state and federal policies created a climate conducive to brownfields 
redevelopment in Baltimore, Maryland.  By analyzing two successful Baltimore projects, 
the research shows how the reuse of brownfields had a positive “ripple-effect” that 
helped precipitate neighborhood-level investment and revitalization.  To help clarify the 
intricacies often associated with the reuse of brownfields, documentation on financing 
mechanisms, tax incentives, and state-level Voluntary Cleanup Program application 
materials are analyzed and described.  The impact of the two case study sites on 
surrounding neighborhoods is researched quantitatively by comparing citywide tax 
assessed values, real property sales records, and building permit data.  The datasets were 
collected for three years (1995, 2001, and 2007) each representing a distinct time period 
in Baltimore’s recent history of brownfield redevelopment.  Lastly, to help establish 
comparable rates of neighborhood investment, this the is uses location quotients based on 
building permit applications.  The quotients compare Baltimore’s citywide building 
activity to building activity in neighborhoods with reclaimed brownfield sites.   
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I. INTRODUCTION TO BROWNFIELDS AND 
BACKGROUND  
 
 As a result of centuries of human exploitation of our planet, the panorama of the 
industrialized world has become littered with tens of thousands of acres of abandoned, 
decaying, and potentially contaminated former industrial sites (Vey 2007).  The size, 
nature, history, and current state of these properties vary tremendously, making it 
difficult to uniformly classify the widespread problem.  In the mid-1980s the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) coined the word brownfield— an all-
encompassing term now used to describe the nation’s quandary of vacant and blighted 
sites. The USEPA’s official definition of a brownfield is “abandoned, idled, or 
underutilized industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is 
complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination (USEPA 2000, 1).”  
Researchers estimate that the United States suffers th  effects of having somewhere 
between five hundred thousand and one million brownfield sites (Amekudzi and 
Fomunung 2004). 
No state in the union is without the brownfields problem.  Rural states like 
Vermont and Maine are spotted with crumbling mill towns, many of which are depressed 
with high unemployment rates, vacant homes, and abandoned mill sites (Kelly 2006).  
Even rural Montana, with its long history of mining and timber activities, is marred with 
countless brownfields.  According to the Montana Department of Environmental Quality, 
mining and wood processing sites are so numerous and often so remote and widely 
dispersed that simply cataloging the tainted lands is currently an insurmountable task for 
the agency (Schmidt 2006).  Still, the brownfields problem is worst in America’s 
Northeast and Midwest—the “rustbelt.”  Buffalo, Hartfo d, Detroit, Pittsburgh, 
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Philadelphia, Youngstown, Cleveland, Baltimore—the former great cities of industry, 
transportation, and American ingenuity are riddled with lands that epitomize blight and 
abandonment.   Even though some aging cities have seen significant improvement and 
rejuvenation, many still suffer from disinvestment a d deteriorating properties still 
saturate entire neighborhoods (Vey 2007).  Changes in transportation modes and aging 
infrastructure contributed to a trend of decentralization, wherein urban industrial and 
manufacturing plants fled rail and harbor linked cities to interstate-connected 
undeveloped tracts of land beyond city cores and close-in suburbs (Amekudzi and 
Fomunung 2004).  Globalization of labor, suburb driven planning, and racial tensions 
have exacerbated decentralization and amplified the brownfields problem (Lazare 1991; 
Fisher 2007).    
Problem Statement: Cancerous Blight and Fear of the Unknown 
Vey suggests that there are an estimated “5 million acres of abandoned industrial 
sites in cities alone—roughly the same amount of land occupied by 60 of the country’s 
largest cities (Vey 2007, 23).”   Unfortunately, the visible deterioration and blight 
associated with brownfields has far reaching consequences for surrounding 
neighborhoods and communities. All too often, abandonment attracts further 
disinvestment and properties adjacent to vacant sites usually suffer disastrous economic 
impacts.  For example, a study conducted by the Wharton School of Business illustrated 
that property in Philadelphia adjacent to vacant lots and brownfields were 20 percent 
below the average property value for the city (Wachter et al. 2008). 
Central cities that once based their economic stability in manufacturing and 
industrial production have been hemorrhaging from nearly epidemic population loss and 
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abandonment of the built environment.  A recent New York Times article about the 
“scourge” of vacant properties highlighted some of the worst vacancy problems in the 
country (Belson 2007).  For example, Buffalo, NY has suffered population losses of over 
50 percent in the last fifty years.  Today the citydemolishes nearly 1,000 abandoned 
homes a year, but of Buffalo’s remaining structures, 3.4 percent are vacant or abandoned.  
St. Louis tops the vacant building list at 3.7 percent and Baltimore rounds out the top 
three vacancy rate cities with 3.2 percent of its remaining structures lying fallow (Belson 
2007).  The vacant structure and brownfields site conundrum drops property values and 
attracts poverty.  Harvard Economics Professor Glaeser (2007) described one “subtle” 
impact of abandonment as follows: 
Declining areas also become magnates for poor people, attracted by cheap 
housing.  This is exactly what happened in Buffalo, whose median home 
value is just $61,000, far below the state average of $260,000.  More than 
10 percent of Buffalo’s residents in 2000, it’s worth noting, had moved 
there since 1995.  The influx of the poor reinforces a city’s downward 
spiral, since it drives up public expenditures while doing little to expand 
the local tax base (Glaeser 2007, 2) 
 
The problem Glaeser (2007) outlines is not unique to Buffalo.  In many rustbelt 
communities the scars caused by vacancy and abandonment act like a cancer, spreading 
blight to nearby neighborhoods (Watcher et al. 2008).  The result continues to be a 
crippling cycle of population loss, more abandonment, disinvestment, and unchecked 
potential for spreading environmental hazards.   
The brownfields dilemma has long been complicated by stigma and fear of dire 
health consequences, and making matters worse, human perceptions about industrial 
pollution are often worsened by media coverage (Yount and Meyer 1994).  The concern 
that uncovering environmental hazards might lead to litigation has halted cleanup action 
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on a great number of idle lands.  For decades, potential real estate developers turned 
away from brownfields fearing that lurking contaminants would open a quandary of 
future law suits.  Nobody wanted to take ownership of a property that may someday be 
cited as the cause for communitywide health problems (Greenburg and Shaw 1992).  In 
addition to developers backing away from brownfield sites, bankers and lenders found 
the brownfields quagmire simply not worth being pulled into.  Therefore, even if owners 
did want to clean up their industrial land it was virtually impossible to obtain financing 
(Yount and Meyer 1994; Byrne and Greco 1997). 
To address the human health concerns and stymie litigation worries, the USEPA 
developed specific brownfields legislation and most sta es adopted liability limiting 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCPs) throughout the 1990s and early twenty-first 
century.  Additionally, to assist with the tremendous financial burden associated with 
contaminant removal or capping, the Federal and state governments instituted tax 
incentives and/or revolving loan funds specifically for brownfield projects.   
In many cases the legislation and creation of brownfields programs has been 
enough to entice developers to mitigate and re-invest in blighted sites.  However, 
developers citing “fear of the unknown,” tend to back way from brownfields that might 
harbor unforeseeable cleanup costs or that are located in areas thought to be economically 
challenged (Howland 2003; Lange and McNeil 2004).  In such cases, traditional lending 
sources and state revolving loan funds may not be adequate to cover potentially 
exorbitant expenses.  When this is the case, state and local authorities need increase their 
participation and help jumpstart redevelopment by using complex and creative, layered 
financing schemes, or very aggressive tax incentives (Paull 2007).   
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Herein lies a twofold problem, 1) high or unknown remediation costs are hard to 
justify in low-market areas, and 2) state and federal policies and incentive programs can 
be viewed as overly cumbersome.  The result is that both planning officials and 
developers may shy away from complicated brownfield r use projects altogether.  
Furthermore, if the economic benefits are not clear, pl nners and developers might 
continue to avoid redeveloping brownfields and opt t  develop in areas outside of urban 
centers (Lange and McNeil 2004).  All of these factors demonstrate a need for adequate 
and positive information about brownfields reuse incentives.  Plus, the long term and 
ancillary benefit of brownfields redevelopment needs to be highlighted and made 
available to municipal authorities, planners, and other stakeholders.   
Thesis Questions   
This study examines two relatively early brownfields remediation projects: a 
former Montgomery Wards retail and distribution facility and a former Proctor and 
Gamble soap manufacturing plant, both in Baltimore, Maryland.  With the information 
gathered, this thesis will address the following questions:  What are the relevant federal, 
state, and local brownfields policies and how are those policies implemented to bring 
about successful brownfields redevelopment? And, does successful brownfield 
redevelopment have a ripple effect and significantly reinvigorate surrounding 
neighborhoods, increase municipal ad valorem tax income, and generally work toward 
the rejuvenation of an aging industrial city? 
This thesis is by no means the first research dedicated to the analysis of 
brownfields reuse.  Others, for instance, have looked at the hedonic value of industrial 
cleanup and determined that ecosystem restoration can positively impact surrounding 
property values (Braden et al. 2006), but little analysis of values has been done on entire 
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neighborhoods surrounding redeveloped sites.  Much of t e foundation for this study is 
based on the need to further analyze the positive changes that take place after a 
redevelopment project.  Braden (2006) surveyed entire communities to determine 
whether or not homeowners would be willing to pay more for real estate if nearby 
brownfield sites were remediated.  The research did not track actual purchases, only the 
opinions of survey participants were measured.  Theparticipants did indicate that they 
would pay more for homes if the area was remediated; but, since the remediation had not 
actually taken place, the study could not track whether or not values truly increased.  
The research of Watcher (2008) was also a cornerstone of this thesis.   Her 
research on vacant properties’ influence over adjacent home values indicates that there is 
a significant link between redevelopment and value ppreciation.  This research will 
expand on Watcher’s type of work and look at the possible influence of much larger 
redevelopment projects on entire neighborhoods rathe  than only adjacent properties. 
Planners and urban geographers wishing to gain insight on how best to utilize 
brownfields redevelopment to curb land-consuming sprawl, often turn to questions 
similar to those found in this thesis (Daniels 2001).  A better understanding of how and 
why state and federal policies exist and highlighting significant economic benefits will 
help push reuse projects to the forefront of America’s need to address steady population 
growth and associated land development needs (Leinburger 2007) .        
Organization of the Thesis 
Major sections of this work, primarily Chapter II, are dedicated to an overview of 
federal and state brownfields programs and policies.  Additionally, a section of Chapter II 
is a revue of contemporary scholarly literature on brownfields.  Chapter III provides an 
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overview of research methods employed for this thesis.  However, before the policies, 
and before the reuse projects, there is a story to be t ld on how and why Baltimore came 
to have its scars of an industrial past.  The beginning of Chapter IV is dedicated to the 
historical and geographical “story” behind Baltimore’s industrial legacy.  Subsequently, 
historical narratives about each site help illustrate the severity of commercial and 
industrial closings in Baltimore.  Chapter IV then moves into in-depth descriptions of 
each case study site and the various reuse attributes associate with reclaiming the vacated 
properties.  
Chapter V is dedicated to quantitative analysis and is aimed at identifying the case 
study sites’ impact on municipal property tax income and whether or not the projects had 
an influence on real property sales in each surrounding neighborhood.   Most importantly, 
Chapter V, through the use of location quotients, investigates the projects’ potential 
influence on investment in the immediate area.  The conclusion, Chapter VI, ties together 
the role of policy, the setting of Baltimore, various aspects of each case study 
redevelopment plan, and the quantitative analysis to illustrate the role of brownfields 
redevelopment in the rejuvenation of Baltimore. Chapter VI also identifies avenues for 
additional brownfields study that could help solidify the importance of reuse projects in 
revitalizing not only Baltimore, but many older industrial cities.      
In short, this thesis is a collection of stories: the story of brownfields policy; the 
story of industrial Baltimore; the story(s) of two abandoned sites; and lastly, the 
quantifiable story of success.  These stories all tie together to answer the aforementioned 
research questions—what are the brownfields policies, and do those policies revitalize 
aging industrial cities? 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW: BROWNFIELDS POLICIES 
AND SCHOLARLY ASSESSMENTS 
 
The following sections examine the evolution of federal and state brownfields 
legislation.  The final section of this chapter is a review of scholarly literature that 
explores both policy and brownfield redevelopment successes and failures.   
Early Brownfields Policy 
 Since the first environmental contamination legislat on in 1980, the USEPA has 
worked continuously to create extensive policies for contaminated lands.   Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, the American public was becoming ore and more aware of the 
devastating health consequences associated with industrial pollution and, subsequently, 
there was a significant rise in high-profile, high-dollar law suits linked to industrial sites. 
Consequently, owners of  land with (perceived or real) contamination often elected to 
erect high fences and simply “mothball” their idle real estate (De Sousa 2004).    
Fifteen years after the earliest cleanup legislation, the USEPA established the 
Brownfields Pilot Program in 1995.  The program’s goal was to help remedy the growing 
social and environmental problems (USEPA 2006a) associated with former industrial 
sites.  The USEPA set out to develop a program design d to combat the ubiquitous 
negative stigma surrounding brownfields. 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act  
The first piece of legislation addressing contaminated sites passed by Congress on 
December 11, 1980, was labeled the Comprehensive Enironmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).  The CERCLA title and many of law’s 
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original provisions remain in effect today, but the“CERCLA” label, for the most part, 
applies only to very large and/or severely contaminated sites.   Properties listed by the 
USEPA under this act are considered a national priority and are commonly referred to as 
“Superfund Sites.”  The 1980 law created a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries 
and provided broad Federal authority to respond directly to releases or threatened releases 
of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment (USEPA 
2006a).   The legislation also set forth standards for closed and abandoned hazardous 
waste sites and established a cleanup trust fund to finance remediation of areas where no 
responsible party could be identified.   One of the most significant portions of the 
legislation set out to establish who could be held liable for the releases of hazardous 
waste (USEPA 2006a).  The early CERCLA provisions eacted aggressive “joint and 
several liability” measures that allowed for virtually any owner in the chain of title of a 
contaminated site to be deemed responsible for cleanup nd/or remediation. 
Unfortunately, CERCLA brought about many unintended consequences and 
negative perceptions of vacant industrial sites began to swell (Yount and Meyer 1994).  
Because of the joint and several liability clauses and the wide interpretation of who could 
be held responsible, this early legislation increased litigation fears among property 
owners and commercial lending institutions.  The passage of CERCLA and subsequent 
media coverage heightened the general public’s awareness, and fear, of potential 
environmental dangers.  By the mid-1990s, rather than putting vacated sites back into 
productive use and alleviating blighted areas, the li igious tone of the law had caused the 
nation’s inventory of brownfields to grow.     
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In 1986, the original CERCLA laws were amended with the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).  Changes to the original CERCLA 
language placed more emphasis on permanent contamination treatment and the use of 
innovative technology for remediation.  With an increased focus on human health 
problems associated with industrial contamination, the USEPA increased the CERCLA 
trust to $8.5 billion, increased state participation, and began to emphasize the importance 
of citizen participation (USEPA 2006b). 
Even with the changes enacted in SARA, the litigation aspect of CERCLA policy 
of the 1980s and early 1990s remained simple: the “polluter pays.”  It was perceived that 
the USEPA could cast a “very broad net” in determining who a responsible party could 
be (Newlon 1997).  In the program’s early years there was a perception that virtually any 
industrial site could be classified as a “superfund site.” Lacking a less inflammatory 
statute, the fear of property owners, developers, and lending institutions was that almost 
any abandoned industrial area could fall under the definition of a CERCLA site.  Hence, 
the legislation instigated a fear that any party somehow affiliated with the management of 
a company, at any time, might somehow be liable for irresponsible polluting.   
The intent of the CERCLA litigation provision was to impose strict liability on 
any person who “owned” and/or “operated” facilities at the time of the release of any 
contamination or industrial waste.  However, defining ownership in litigious 
environmental cases is not always straightforward and banking/lending institutions grew 
concerned about being pulled into environmental court cases.  Consider the following 
legal opinion from Greenberg and Shaw (1992): “It is important to consider how 
‘ownership’ is defined by state common law.  In states that utilize a title theory for 
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mortgages (as opposed to a lien theory), the mortgagees (lenders) hold actual title to the 
secured property and thus can be considered owners of the property” (Greenberg and 
Shaw 1992, 1214). 
Democratic Representative John J. LaFalce of New York succinctly described the 
lender’s point of view on CERCLA policies at a legislative hearing with the following: 
There is no certainty to the potential lender.  Thelender says: ’What … is 
USEPA going to do, what are the courts going to do? I do not know.  
Why should I create a headache for myself?... [I] do not know what the 
costs [for the cleanup of hazardous waste] are going t  be, so if [I] make a 
$10,000 loan [I] might be liable for a $2 million cleanup,’” Democratic 
Representative John J. LaFalce of New York (cited in Greenberg and 
Shaw 1992, 1211).  
 
Federal policy makers finally addressed the major concern of perceived lender 
liability in 1996 with the passage of the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and 
Deposit Insurance Protection Act.   Though the act did not totally alleviate a banker’s 
liability in cases of potential environmental contamination, the act took tremendous 
strides in advancing the financing of brownfields projects.  The 1996 amendments to 
CERCLA centered on clarifying the concepts of participation in management and 
foreclosure (Byrne and Greco 1997.).  The new legisation allowed for a bank to lend 
and, if need be, foreclose on a property and not be considered the property owner.  Byrne 
and Greco explain that “Post-foreclosure actions such as maintaining business operation, 
preparing the property for sale or disposing of assets are protected so long as the lender is 
actively moving to divest the property” (Byrne and Greco 1997, 89). 
In summary, the key provisions of CERCLA or, “Superfund,” did the following: 
• Identified land-based toxic contamination as a public health issue 
• Gave responsibility to federal authorities to lead fforts to clean toxic-
waste sites 
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• USEPA was given response authority to act quickly in cases where the 
public health is threatened.   
• Provided for a public funding mechanism to pay for initial cleanup at 
sites where public health is threatened 
• Places responsibility for paying cleanup costs squarely on those who 
caused the contamination (Bartsch and Dean 2002; USEPA 2006a) 
 
Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative 
Preceding the major CERCLA revisions in 1996 was the establishment of the 
USEPA Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative and the Brownfields Pilot 
Assessment Grant Program in 1995.  CERCLA was only addressing large and/or highly 
contaminated properties and the majority of idle industrial land remained a local (or state) 
dilemma that was not being addressed by federal lawmakers. The USEPA had been 
pouring billions of dollars into CERCLA, but policy analysts continued to call for 
significant change and for the creation of a new program that addressed smaller sites not 
on the CERCLA list.  For instance Rosenburg stated:   
There have been numerous attempts to reform the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
also known as Superfund, since its inception. The act originally 
promulgated $1.6 billion in funding to provide for the rapid cleanup of 
those sites designated as the most dangerous and plced on the National 
Priorities List (NPL). In 1986, Congress increased the amount of the 
Superfund to $8.5 billion and added another $5.1 billion in 1990. Overall, 
it is estimated that the total amount of money spent on the Superfund 
program is between 25 and 30 billion dollars. While current Superfund 
reform continues to unfold, Congress has promised to provide a more 
sensible approach to environmental cleanup, including the possible repeal 
of retroactive, strict and joint and several liability up to a fixed point in 
time (Rosenberg 1995, 53). 
 
The above referenced “more sensible approach” Congress came up with in 1995 
was the USEPA Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative program. The new 
initiative was “designed to empower states, cities, tribes, communities, and other 
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stakeholders in economic redevelopment to work together in a timely manner to prevent, 
assess, safely clean up, and sustainably reuse brownfields (USEPA 2000, 1).”   The 
USEPA aimed to start a program that could begin analyzing the myriad of abandoned 
industrial lands that had not been identified as a “ uperfund” site.  Under the new pilot 
program, states, municipalities, tribal governments and other eligible stakeholders could 
apply to the USEPA for assessment grants up to $200,00   With these grants, the 
recipients could inventory, characterize, assess, and conduct planning and community 
involvement related to brownfield sites (USEPA 2000).  An early goal of the Brownfields 
Economic Redevelopment Initiative was to fund at lest fifty Brownfields Pilots in 1995 
and 1996 with the monies to be used for the assessment of sites potentially contaminated 
by hazardous substances or petroleum.   Consequently, o e of the first Brownfields Pilot 
$200,000 grants was awarded to the City of Baltimore in July of 1995 (USEPA 1997).   
A second financial aspect of the USEPA Brownfields Economic Redevelopment 
Initiative was the creation of the Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund (BCRLF).   
The loan program set up $1 million revolving loans to be used over a five-year period to 
provide financial assistance for the environmental cleanup of brownfields (USEPA 
2000).  Again, the City of Baltimore was an early recipient of BCRLF dollars.  In 
September of 1997, the USEPA awarded Baltimore witha $350,000 dollar revolving loan 
to fund cleanup on properties anywhere in the city (USEPA 1997).   
From 1995 to 2002 the USEPA brownfields program wasoperated as a “pilot;” 
meaning that the program was experimental and not fully authorized by Congress.   
Finally, the 107th Congress enacted the Brownfields Act in 2002 and the site assessment 
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grants and the revolving loan funds of the programs became actual federal policy 
(USEPA 2006a).   
Along with assessment grants and revolving loans, a third major component of 
federal encouragement to cleanup and reuse brownfield sit s was the creation of various 
tax incentives made available to proactive landowners and developers.  The major federal 
tax legislation of 1997, the Taxpayer Relief Act, contained a substantial section 
pertaining to brownfields and environmental remediation.  The language of section 198 
of the act allows for the “Expensing of Environmental Remediation Costs (IRS 1997).”  
The language of the act reads as follows: 
(a) In General.--A taxpayer may elect to treat any qualified environmental 
remediation expenditure which is paid or incurred by the taxpayer as an 
expense which is not chargeable to capital account. Any expenditure 
which is so treated shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year in 
which it is paid or incurred (IRS 1997, 111).   
 
The original 1997 language of the tax law placed various geographic restrictions 
on brownfields eligible for the tax benefit, however, in 2000 several amendments to the 
original language made it possible for virtually all owners of contaminated properties to 
benefit from the federal tax incentive.  Adding to the tax incentives for development of 
abandoned industrial and commercial facilities is the IRS tax incentive for distressed 
properties located in federal empowerment zones.   Originally written in 2001, with the 
latest version of the credit written in 2004, IRS policy allows for taxpayers in designated 
federal empowerment zones (areas often laden with brownfields) to achieve a wide array 
of tax credits.   Some of the benefits listed by the IRS for reuse of facilities in distressed 
areas include: Tax-exempt Bond Financing, Qualified Zone Academy Bonds, Work 
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Opportunity Credits, Welfare-to-Work Credits, and possible capital gain exclusions (IRS 
2004). 
State Voluntary Cleanup Programs  
The federal government’s clarification of liability and the three-pronged financial 
package (assessment grants, revolving loan funds, a tax credits) truly helped with the 
genesis of brownfields reuse projects.  The USEPA had successfully developed a 
brownfields program with a dual design: a program that both enhanced job development 
through economic stimulation in downtrodden areas, and which eliminated environmental 
hazard risks to people living near contaminated sites (Greenberg et al. 2001).  However, 
the USEPA grants were, and still are, relatively small at only $200,000.  Additionally, the 
federal revolving loan fund maximum loan amounts ofen fall far short of the monies 
needed to remediate a brownfield.  And finally, clarification that the classification of a 
“Superfund” would be reserved for our country’s most contaminated sites, left the 
majority of brownfields oversight in the hands of individual states.  
In response to CERCLA only addressing high priority s es, states (starting with 
Minnesota in 1988, Illinois 1989, and Oregon in 199) began implementing state-level 
brownfields offices and VCPs (Bartsch and Dean 2002). Today, all fifty states have some 
sort of brownfields program enacted by their legislatures (USEPA 2006a).  In the mid-
1990s there was a huge rise in state run VCPs.  Maryland, along with Florida, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia 
all passed their first Brownfields acts and/or established VCPs in 1997 (Bartsch and Dean 
2002). 
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Brownfields Programs Take Hold at the State Level in Maryland 
 By 1997 state run brownfields programs had passed (or had legislation pending) 
in a majority of states. In Maryland, lawmakers unanimously passed two major pieces of 
legislation aimed at stimulating the redevelopment of idle and abandoned properties.  The 
measures created a VCP to be administered by the Maryland Department of Environment 
(MDE) and developed the Brownfields Revitalization Incentive Program (BRIP) within 
the Maryland Department of Business and Economic Development (DBED)(Carey and 
Arnold 2002). 
 As part of a guide to redeveloping brownfield properties, Carey and Arnold 
summarize the major provision of the bills with thefollowing five points: 
1. Establishes a Voluntary Cleanup Program administered by MDE and a 
program of financial incentives administered by DBED. 
2. Allows a participant in the voluntary cleanup program to choose 
among cleanup standards, including uniform numeric risk based on 
site-specific risk assessments. Background based on federal or state 
maximum contaminant levels, or other federal or state cleanup 
standards. 
3. Provides for the release of Voluntary Cleanup Program participants 
from MDE enforcement actions and from contribution actions by 
responsible persons. As well as from further liabilty for remediation 
of contamination identified in the program applicaton papers.  
4. Set criteria for the Brownfields Revitalization Incentive Program under 
which DBED may select brownfields sites within participating local 
jurisdictions to receive financial incentives. Including low-interest 
loans, grants and property tax credits. 
5. Includes safe harbor provisions for lenders to encourage participation 
in brownfields projects by reducing the risk of liability under state law. 
(Carey and Arnold 2002, 625-626) 
 
The Maryland programs, federal assessment funding, and major revision of 
CERCLA were finally coming together to create a climate in which insightful developers 
could begin to remediate brownfields and refurbish Maryland’s vast stock of vacated 
industrial complexes.   Pre-1997 liability fears coupled with severely low marketability 
  
 - 17 - 
actually had created an incentive for many landowners to simply keep their sites as 
abandoned or idle real estate (Howland 2000; De Sousa 2004).   Finally, the USEPA 
changes and Maryland legislation had paved the way for dozens of redevelopment efforts 
to begin statewide—but especially in the City of Baltimore.   
Similar to federal tax incentives for cleanup, Maryl nd began to offer real 
property tax credits to brownfields that qualified for remediation assistance from the 
Maryland BRIP.  In order to receive any of the financi l benefit, the property owner must 
participate in the state’s VCP.  Brownfield sites meeting the state’s criteria can receive a 
real property tax credit between 50 and 70 percent of the new increment of taxes on the 
increased value of the site. If the site is within an Enterprise Zone, the tax credit may last 
for up to 10 years (Maryland 2007). 
The Maryland VCP and brownfields tax incentives were part of a much larger 
state growth management policy initiated under the administration of then governor 
Parris Glendening.  The Glendening administration developed a multitude of planning 
policies, named “Smart Growth,” which aimed at prese ving open space by directing 
growth to existing urban areas.  The Smart Growth policies of Maryland developed 
zones, “Priority Funding Areas (PFAs),” in which state money would go to assist with the 
development of infrastructure.  Developers electing o build outside of PFAs would not 
be eligible for any state assistance.  Additionally Maryland created one of the most 
lucrative historic tax credits in the county to ince tivize the reuse of existing structures 
within already populated areas of the state (Daniels 2001; Sams 2007a). 
Later sections of this thesis will highlight how the Smart Growth policies helped 
to create a climate ideal for the reuse of brownfield sites long thought to be too risky for 
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investment and redevelopment.  First however, many scholars and analysts have weighed 
in on various aspects of brownfields and the following section reviews a sampling of 
articles and papers focused on the implications of br wnfields policy.    
Scholarly Assessment of Brownfields Policy and Value Implications 
The level of success of federal brownfields initiatives have been closely tracked 
by policy analysts and researchers throughout the program’s twenty-plus year history.  
For the most part, early feedback from the mid-1990s was that CERCLA, to date, had 
been a failure.  Industry might have stopped blatant polluting, but many properties 
remained idle and very little was being done about industrial contaminants already in 
soils and groundwater.  Other than a few high-profile and often high-dollar law suits, the 
vacant industrial quagmire remained a huge national problem (Rosenberg 1995).  The 
following excerpt from a 1995 paper published in thePollution Engineering Journal 
captured what many analysts were saying about the first ten to fifteen years of CERCLA:     
One thing is for certain, there is increased recognition that, despite good 
intentions, the federal Superfund law has been a dismal failure and a major 
deterrent to the redevelopment of industrial urban areas and contaminated 
properties. In need of a fix and with an obsessive desire to remove the 
stigma long associated with the Superfund program, the USEPA will hang 
its hat on the Brownfields Initiative. This initiatve is intended to 
demonstrate ways to return contaminated, unproductive, abandoned urban 
sites to productive use and ensure that future development is accomplished 
in a sustainable, environmentally sound manner (Rosenberg 1995, 53). 
 
In the above passage, Rosenberg (1995) is writing on the cusp of the 
creation of USEPA’s Brownfields Initiative.  As previously stated, the program 
was established in 1995 and operated as a pilot program until the 107th Congress 
passed the Brownfields Act in 2002.  Of course, the program still has its critics, 
and undoubtedly every stakeholder could probably recommend revisions to 
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current statute, but for the most part researchers and analysts have written 
favorably about the program (Wernstedt 2004). Again,  brief quotation from a 
paper published in a professional journal touches on the history of brownfields 
legislation: 
If one compares the state of affairs vis-à-vis the redevelopment of 
brownfields today to that of 10 years ago, it is clear that federal and state 
promotion of brownfields has yielded numerous success stories of idled 
and underutilized contaminated properties that now h use a variety of 
economic activities (Eisen 2007, 3). 
 
Additionally, the brownfields programs have been labe ed a success by the 
environmental justice community (Felten 2006).  When the USEPA forged the 
Brownfields program in 1995 out of the existing CERCLA initiatives, administrators 
listened to requests from citizen groups like the National Environmental Justice Advisory 
Committee and made citizen participation a basic principle of brownfields 
redevelopment.  In an article discussing the positive mpacts of national brownfields 
policy, Felten (2006) explained that brownfields redevelopment legislation implemented 
in the mid-1990s demonstrated a federal and state commitment to community 
participation. 
Although not a major factor in either case study site elected for this thesis, public 
participation is considered an important aspect in the reuse of many urban brownfield 
projects (Greenberg and Lewis 2000; Solitare and Greenberg 2002; Felten 2006; Gute 
and Taylor 2006).   Greenburg and Lewis (2000) uncovered a unique aspect of public 
participation after surveying over 200 residents in the City of Perth Amboy, NJ.  Again, 
one of the original intents of the USEPA’s brownfields program was economic stimulus 
through attracting new industry and business to brownfields sites, however, the authors’ 
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survey that found that residents placed economic stimulus behind other brownfield 
reuses.  Given a choice on what to do with a brownfield, the survey participants placed 
highest preference on recreational, cultural and other community facilities, followed by 
new housing.   In addition, over three quarters of th se surveyed indicated a desire to 
participate in the redevelopment process (Greenberg and Lewis 2000). 
Further study of the importance of public participation was discussed by Gute and 
Taylor (2006) in their case study of brownfields redevelopment in Bridgeport, CT.  Gute 
and Taylor used lessons learned from two major brownfields redevelopment sites to 
outline the importance of a strong communication process between both government 
officials, stakeholders, and the general public.  A major recommendation of the authors 
states: 
All stakeholders need to be thoroughly involved in the conceptualization, 
planning and each decision-making node of the redevlopment process.  
This is particularly true for those stakeholders that will be the actual users 
or abutters of the redeveloped site (Gute and Taylor 2006, 555). 
      
In his article, Ellerbusch (2006) looks deeper into public participation and 
compares early brownfields policy to our nation’s fir t—usually unsuccessful— urban 
renewal programs.  He points out that lack of community participation in 1960s-era urban 
renewal programs may have led to increased crime, segregation, and isolation of 
impoverished citizens.  In short, the first government programs designed to improve 
downtrodden urban conditions lead to a “massive fedrally subsidized economic risk 
redistribution program (Ellerbusch 2006, 559)” that ac ually exacerbated disinvestment in 
urban areas.  Ellerbusch looks at brownfields redevlopment through a lens of risk, and 
suggests that without ample public participation, risk is merely transferred from one 
group of residents to another.  For example, if an abandoned brownfield site is heaping 
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with trash, the property represents a risk to nearby residents.  However, if the trash is not 
properly removed and remediated, the risk could simply be transferred to another 
population group.   
Greenburg (1999) addressed this exact scenario whendescribing a brownfield site 
in Rahway, NJ. In Rahway, trash removal helped one group of residents, but another 
group of residents suffered ill-health affects (increased air pollutants and increased truck 
traffic) when the garbage was moved and burned in another neighborhood’s incinerator 
(Greenberg et al. 1998).  Ellerbusch (2006) suggests that the transfer of risk in such a 
case could have been mitigated with increased public participation. 
In seeking to understand if the USEPA was employing many of the community 
participation, environmental justice, and economic revitalization goals of the pilot 
brownfields legislation of the early 1990s, Solitare (2002) analyzed the distribution of 
USEPA site assessment grants.    The author used economic data from the 1990 Census 
to determine if the USEPA was awarding brownfields pilot grants to cities most in need 
of federal assistance. The study did find that a disproportionate number of grants were 
given to economically distressed communities, and therefore Solitare hailed the program 
as an environmental justice success. 
Other scholarly articles have looked at the real estat  and neighborhood impacts 
of brownfields redevelopment (Howland 2000; Leigh and Coffin 2000; Kaufman and 
Cloutier 2006; Ellerbusch 2006; Gute and Taylor 2006).   Howland (2000) studied land 
transactions in Baltimore to determine whether or not contamination had a significant 
impact on property value.  The study did find that when a site’s price was lowered to 
compensate buyers for the risk of acquiring a brownfield, the actual number of land 
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purchases was not deterred.  Suggesting that federal and state liability limiting legislation 
was having a positive impact, Howland (2000) actually disproved the notion that 
contamination reduced the demand for industrial land in desirable locations.  Her study 
clearly showed there was an active market for industrial land located close to gentrified 
neighborhoods and downtown Baltimore (Howland 2000).     
Leigh and Coffin (2000) used a hedonic pricing model to help understand the 
relationship of property values and their proximity to brownfield sites.  In their study, the 
researchers analyzed values and brownfield sites in Cleveland and Atlanta.  Their 
hedonic models demonstrated that the closer a property was to a brownfield site the more 
likely it was to have a decreased value, even if the site had been remediated.  The authors 
suggested that high concentrations of non-remediated ndustrial sites close to remediated 
sites continued to have negative impact on surrounding property values.  The researchers 
compared property values before and after the USEPA unveiled the Brownfields Pilot 
Program in 1995.  The study found that for the heavily industrialized city of Cleveland, 
awareness of known sites (listed brownfields) led to “considerable uncertainty” before 
1995, while federally supported efforts to clean up listed sites after that date helped 
reduce that uncertainty (Leigh and Coffin 2000).  In short, the paper suggests that, even 
though values are depressed around brownfield sites, more real estate transactions were 
likely to occur in industrial cities after authorities enact brownfields policies.  
Unfortunately, in Atlanta, a city without a strong industrial legacy, the federal policies 
did not initially lead to increased real estate transactions and higher values.  Leigh and 
Coffin (2000) postulate that because Atlanta’s citizens were not as accustomed to 
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industrial land as were Cleveland citizens, new brownfields policies may have 
heightened, rather than dispelled, local concerns about contamination.  
With the exception of early policy impacts in Atlant  most scholarly papers 
suggest that federal and state brownfields policies play a significant role in property 
values (Leigh and Coffin 2000; Howland 2000; Ellerbusch 2006; Kaufman and Cloutier 
2006).   
The following chapter outlines the methods used in this thesis to document the 
transformation of the two sites in this case study.  Chapter III also describes the methods 
used to determine both changing property values and neighborhood investment resulting 
from significant brownfields legislation both in Maryland and at the federal level.   
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III. METHODOLOGY      
The methods used in this research are a blend of the case study approach and 
quantitative analysis.  The first thesis question, ‘what are the relevant federal, state, and 
local brownfields policies and how are those policies implemented to bring about 
successful brownfields redevelopment?’ is primarily answered through the preceding 
literature and policy review and the following case studies.  In order to answer the second 
thesis question, ‘does successful brownfields redevlopment have a ripple effect and 
significantly reinvigorate surrounding neighborhoods, increase municipal ad valorem tax 
income and generally work toward the rejuvenation of an aging industrial city?’ this 
research turns to the case studies and quantitative analysis.  How these methods were 
employed is expanded in the following sub-sections. 
Case Study   
As stated in Chapter I, the nature of this thesis is one of in-depth case studies of 
two unique former industrial sites within Baltimore’s city limits.  Each site was chosen 
for very distinct, yet similar reasons.  The development firms of both sites filed 
applications with the MDE within the same year and both sites completed the 
environmental remediation phase of work in 2001.  Both sites made a transition from 
abandonment to office and mixed-use properties, and both sites are currently the 
headquarters of each respective development firm.  
 In total, 458 VCP applications had been filed with Maryland’s cleanup program 
as of December 20, 2006.  Over one-third  (170) of the applications were for sites in 
Baltimore (MDE 2006b).  Many applications represent small cleanup activities, such as 
soil removal at an existing auto mechanic shop, while others were large scale public sites, 
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such as the grounds surrounding Camden Yards, Baltimore’s professional baseball 
stadium.   In addition, many of the brownfield site in Baltimore are located in federal 
empowerment zones and/or state enterprise zones. Th two sites selected represent early 
projects where commercial/industrial buildings were l ft intact and created office spaces 
in neighborhoods that traditionally had few or no office buildings.  Both are located in the 
relatively large Maryland Enterprise Zone, which enables business owners to qualify for 
several state tax incentives.  One the sites, Montgomery Park, is situated in a Federal 
Empowerment Zone, areas wherein businesses qualify for a list of federal tax incentives 
(HUD 2007b; Empower Baltimore 2008). These redevelopment sites are unique in the 
fact that they represented the first redevelopment of a brownfield in each respective 
neighborhood.       
 The case study gives a researcher the ability to understand a larger dynamic by 
analyzing single settings (Eisenhardt 2002).  The approach has been used by academics, 
research institutes, policy analysts, and governmental agencies to highlight successful 
projects and develop effective legislation and national policies (Greenberg et al. 2001). 
As with this thesis, many studies analyzing the impacts of brownfields redevelopment on 
property values have continually looked to the case study (Howland 2000; Leigh and 
Coffin 2000).   Schoenbaum (2002) turned to the cas study approach to elucidate 
changes in industrial property values within Baltimore’s city limits.  In another Baltimore 
study analyzing the relationship of public subsidy and “successful” brownfields 
redevelopment, Howland (2003), compared various attribu es of three major brownfields 
redevelopment projects.   
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History, Literature and Document Review, and Stakeholder Discussions 
Historical Context 
This thesis dedicates significant attention to the historical and geographical 
context—the why and how Baltimore became an industrial giant, and then suffered from a 
major economic fall.  Baltimore was once the second largest and one of the greatest cities 
in America, but today it is listed by the Brookings In titution as one of the “bottom fifth 
cities”—one of the lowest “sixty-five weak older industrial cities” in America (Vey 
2007).  Similar writings about the fall of prosperity in rust-belt cities have discussed the 
geographical and historical significance of a city’s rise to greatness.  For example, when 
discussing the present state of Buffalo, NY, Glaeser (2007), details the community’s 
history and its link to the Erie Canal.  Glaeser, of the Harvard School of Economics 
writes, “The history of Buffalo helps us understand why it continues to lose people and 
why it will be hard to reverse the trend” (Glaeser 2007, 1).   
One of the unique personalities of Baltimore is the fact that its citizens seem to 
embrace and cherish the city’s industrial past.  A marker of the peoples’ affection for 
their industrial roots is the success of the Baltimore Museum of Industry (BMI).  
Appropriately, the BMI is located on a former brownfield site, close to the city’s urban 
core.  Situated on the Baltimore waterfront, the BMI serves as a devoted reminder of the 
city’s industrial pride.  Administrators and historians at the BMI were exceptionally 
helpful in finding documentation and assisting the researcher with understanding the 
significance of Baltimore’s industrial past.   
The format of meetings with BMI representatives took place as open discussions 
and note-taking by the researcher.  The museum curator granted access to BMI files 
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containing a variety of information and sources pertaining to the region’s industrial roots.  
Documentation in BMI files is as diverse as Baltimore’s past and ranges from reports on 
the beer making process (beer was a top industry in he blue collar city for well over a 
century), to newspaper clippings describing the closure of industrial plants.   Meeting 
with representatives, touring the museum, and obtaining literature gave the basis for the 
establishment of time and place, essentials of geographical research. 
Voluntary Cleanup Program Documentation and the Maryland Department of 
the Environment Processes 
The application process for the VCP within the Brownfields Division of MDE is 
lengthy, requiring preliminary environmental assessments and tremendous 
documentation.  Although considered streamlined in comparison to many states, 
Maryland’s VCP is still time consuming, costly, and perplexing to developers and/or 
researchers first attempting to understand its procedures.  As a non-participant, the 
researcher attended informational meetings between MDE Brownfields Division staff and 
stakeholders associated with the cleanup and redevelopm nt of sites.  Meeting attendees 
typically included representatives from the party or c mpany who currently owned or 
were in the process of purchasing a brownfield site, a development firm representative (if 
new development was planned for the area), and a scientist or representative from an 
environmental consulting firm.  Also in attendance w re two to four MDE staff scientists 
(geologists and toxicologists), MDE contact people assigned to each VCP application, 
and brownfields program leadership.   
In all, the researcher attended four informational meetings.  The order of business 
at each meeting ranged from familiarizing first-time VCP participants with Maryland’s 
voluntary cleanup regulations and program, to second level meetings where cleanup had 
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begun on a site and environmental consultants were sharing findings and searching for 
MDE approval to begin construction.  Attendance at ach of these sessions proved to be 
extremely informative and helped to explain printed materials offered by the state.  One 
of the advancements in Maryland’s VCP is the fact tha he brownfields group, as 
standard practice, provides these informational meetings to all applicants to the VCP.  
The research method used was observation and note-taking. 
Attendance at the informational meetings also made it possible to establish 
relationships with MDE personnel and gain access to all documentation pertaining to the 
cleanup of each site.  Completed VCP files frequently grow to be hundreds of pages in 
length.  Soils data, remediation methods and proposals, and various requests for future 
land uses were all made available to the researcher.  The documentation was vital to 
understanding the cleanup process and helped reveal the scope and magnitude 
brownfields reuse projects.  This method included a review of remediation work and 
costs associated with the efforts required to obtain a “Letter of No Further Action” from 
MDE. 
To further understand the assorted concepts and factors involved in brownfields 
reuse projects, the researcher also gathered financing information about each project from 
various sources.  However, some of the private financial matters were not available in 
detail and the research relied on general tax and loan program guidelines.  In some cases, 
the researcher contacted, in person or via telephone, people key to the development of 
each site.  These stakeholders included project managers, Baltimore Development 
Corporation (BDC) representatives, MDE officials, and facilities managers.  The 
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conversations gave a unique perspective on the reclamation of brownfields and helped 
clarify federal and state financing opportunities for brownfields redevelopment.   
Quantitative Analysis  
 On June 20, 2007, the researcher met with officials from the City of Baltimore in 
the offices of Baltimore Housing.  In attendance was the Director of Baltimore Housing, 
Stephen Janes, and Research Specialist, Brenda Davies.  The researcher, Mr. Janes, and 
Ms. Davies concluded that in order to track economic investment and activity in a 
neighborhood, three datasets depicting three different time periods would be needed.   
The datasets would be 1) all sales data for the entire ci y, 2) all building and improvement 
permits pulled for the entire city, and 3) all tax assessments and city appraisal records, 
known as Current Full Cash Value (CFCV).  These thre datasets were collected for three 
years: FY1995, FY2001, and FY2007 and include all property types (e.g., residential, 
commercial, industrial). 
The sales records help to quantify increases or decreases in real estate value as 
determined by willing buyers and sellers.  Actual sale  records are perhaps the most 
accurate indication of market value. However, sales may take place sporadically and 
high- or low-value outliers may easily skew the findings.  Tax records provide data on all 
real estate parcels and help to determine overall value changes in both individual sites 
and entire neighborhoods.  Although, tax appraisals are not done on an annual basis and 
assessments may significantly lag behind actual appreciation.   Finally, the researcher 
obtained building permit data to help understand what level of building/investment 
activity is taking place in a neighborhood during a very specific time period.  Building 
permit requests are filed with the city for a wide range of construction and site 
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improvement activity.  On a permit request form the owner or contractor states the type 
of work to be completed and the estimated cost of improvements.  These records give the 
researcher immediate insight into improvement activity (i.e., investment) taking place in 
a specified location.  
 Determining years to compare  
The CFCV records are the values of land and improvements set by the state tax 
assessor’s office for all tax parcels.  The appraisals in Baltimore City are done on a three- 
year cycle making it important to obtain data only i  three-year increments.  If years were 
chosen at random, or if the researcher wanted to evaluate specific years (e.g., the year a 
building became vacant or the year a project was completed), information might not 
accurately represent assessed values when comparing more than one site.  By studying 
neighborhoods in six-year intervals (two three-year assessment cycles), the researcher 
can accurately compare changes in tax assessed value.   The six-year interval alleviates 
the possibility that one set of records comes from early in the three year assessment cycle 
and the second or third set of records comes later in the assessment cycle.  With six-year 
intervals, the researcher will be comparing the same ti e-period within the cycle with 
each evaluation. 
 For the purpose of this study, luckily, the data align with three distinct periods in 
Baltimore.  In FY1995, both of the case study propeties were vacant or in the process of 
ceasing operations.  Additionally, the governor’s Smart Growth package and brownfields 
legislation had not been passed by the state legislature.  In the second period, FY2001, 
both case study sites were nearing completion but were not yet occupied.  For example, 
MDE sent Struever Bros., Eccles and Rouse (the Proctor and Gamble site developer) a 
letter of “No Further Requirements Determination” which essentially meant the 
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completion of the VCP process, on August 20, 2001 (Metz 2001a).  The “No Further 
Requirements Determination” letter was sent to Himmelrich and Associates (the 
Montgomery Park developer) on February 5, 2001 (Metz 2001b).  The final period, 
FY2007, for which the most recent data are available, captures what impact the 
redevelopment projects might have had on the surrounding neighborhood.     
 The majority of the analysis for this research focuses on how brownfields 
redevelopment impacted the surrounding neighborhood and, consequently, how that 
neighborhood compared to the rest of the city.  This comparison was done with the use of 
location quotients.   
Permit Data Location Quotients 
To compare the requests for building and improvement p rmits in each 
neighborhood to the rest of Baltimore City, the researcher has calculated a permit data 
location quotient (LQ) for each of the three years analyzed.  Location quotients are 
generally used to compare a city or a region’s economic activity to that of the nation as a 
whole. For example, economists employ location quotients to understand the economic 
relationship of an urban area to the national economy.  As described by Leigh (1970) a 
“normal” economic characteristic of a single urban area is assumed to be a microcosm of 
the nation as a whole.  The concept is described by the following: 
On the assumption that a ‘normal’ urban economy is a microcosm of the 
national economy, a location quotient above one (1.0) for a particular 
urban activity is said to indicate an activity in which the given city is 
apparently unusually specialized, given its overall size.  The higher the 
quotient, the greater is the local specialization in the given industry (Leigh 
1970, 202). 
 
Location quotients are a very useful tool in determining a variety of area-specific 
characteristics and can be applied to a variety of ge graphic areas.  If a LQ for the 
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smaller region (i.e., neighborhood, city, county, etc.) is equal to “1.0” the smaller region 
would have the same activity (e.g., number of employees in a job sector, or number of 
permits pulled per tax parcel) as the larger region.   For example, a neighborhood can be 
compared to surrounding city, and a county can be compared to the surrounding state, 
etc.  The higher the number is above “1.0” the greater the activity is in the small region 
when compared to the encompassing region.  If the LQ is below “1.0” the activity in the 
sub-region takes place at a rate less than the parent-region.  
Employment rates, health care attributes, and other locally identifiable datasets 
can be compared to the larger, surrounding region  (Moineddin et al. 2003). Location 
quotient research has been done at the city/neighborhood level in analyzing  rates of 
crime to help determine “hot spots” of criminal activity (Brantingham and Brantingham 
1998); however, the researcher is not aware of location quotient research applied to 
building permit data.  With the use of location quotients, this research is able to 
determine the rate of investment (based on building permit requests) in the case study 
neighborhoods compared to the city as a whole.   
As a means of control, location quotients for permit data are calculated for two 
neighborhoods sharing similar characteristics with the case study neighborhoods, but had 
no brownfield redevelopment projects.  Finally, permit data for all neighborhoods with 
brownfields cleanup activity are aggregated and compared to all of Baltimore. 
 The map below identifies the case study sites, surrounding neighborhoods, and 
the location of all cleanup sites and respective neighborhoods.  However, before analysis 
of tax values, sales, and neighborhood investment is discussed, the following chapter 
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looks at the qualitative story about the transformation of Baltimore and describes the two 
case study sites.  
 
Figure 1.  Map of case study sites, all VCP properties, and surrounding 
neighborhoods. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES: LOCATION AND SITES 
It is important that this thesis look at the historical transition of Baltimore, the city 
encompassing the two sites.  It is not the intention of this chapter to chronologically trace 
the year-by-year transformations of lands, site characteristics, and property ownership;  
instead, this chapter will give a broad regional history in order to establish geographical 
context, both historical and physical, to the select d sites of this study.   
Why, out of all of the naturally occurring deep-water harbors that exist along the 
shoreline of the massive Chesapeake Bay, did Baltimore City end up being one of the 
nation’s largest seaports?  Why was there such a huge b ildup of industrial and 
commercial facilities along a relatively small waterfront?  Why then, after nearly two 
hundred years of steady industrial growth, did the city suddenly loose close to 70 percent 
of its industrially-based jobs?  The answer to thatquestion answers the next: how is it that 
a once burgeoning city, in one of the nation’s wealthiest states, became so abandoned, so 
vitiated with industrial contaminants, and so blighted?   
This thesis will only begin to touch on answers to these questions. The overall 
setting of Baltimore and its history plays an important role in understanding how best to 
address abandoned industrial sites, and therefore the first section of this chapter will help 
establish the historical and spatial significance of the industrial buildup in Baltimore.  In 
this chapter’s following sections, two of the hundre s of brownfields throughout 
Baltimore will be described to help explain how a reuse project can play a major role in 
the transformation of an entire city. 
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Establishing the Geographical and Historical Setting 
“There is but one entrance by sea into this country, and that is at the 
mouth of a very goodly bay, 18 or 20 miles broad. The cape on the south is 
called Cape Henry, in honor of our most noble Prince. The land, white 
hilly sands like unto the Downs, and all along the s ores rest plenty of 
pines and firs ... Within is a country that may have the prerogative over 
the most pleasant places known, for large and pleasant navigable rivers, 
heaven and earth never agreed better to frame a place for man's 
habitation..." 
Captain John Smith, 1612 (Chesapeake 2003, 1)  
 
In 1612, when Captain John Smith made his legendary voyage up the Chesapeake 
Bay, the waters were clear and marine life was plentiful. Countless species of fish were 
so abundant that Smith’s crewmembers could scoop fish out of the water with frying pans 
and oyster beds were so thick that they created stone-like reefs that blocked passages to 
many of the bay’s inlets (Chesapeake 2003).   
With Smith’s description declaring “heaven and earth never agreed better to 
frame a place for man's habitation” (Chesapeake 2003) it didn’t take long for thousands 
of European settlers to discover the bounties of the C esapeake.   Assiduous early 
immigrants learned relatively quickly how to marry the region’s agriculture to its natural 
ports and small harbors, and in 1631 Maryland’s farmers embarked into the extremely 
prosperous cultivation of tobacco (Borio 1997). Within thirty years of Smith’s renowned 
explorations of the Chesapeake, much of Maryland becam  settled by Europeans.  In 
1642, Annapolis (already a bustling seaport community) was declared the region’s 
capitol.  Many small ports and towns dotted the coastline of the Chesapeake Bay and 
farming settlements checkered the Maryland landscape.   
Throughout most of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the economy 
of colonial Maryland was based on tobacco farming ad, like much of the mid-Atlantic 
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region, Maryland emerged as rural and bucolic, marked only by a series of quaint farming 
villages and small seaport towns.  Tobacco only needed to be harvested, dried and 
brought to ships for transport.  The crop required no expensive infrastructure for refining 
before it was sold: no grist milling, shucking, or labor intensive processing.   Economies 
of this sort had little need for large cites to provide labor forces, factories, and 
warehousing facilities.   A network of roads leading to a port town was all a farmer 
needed to exchange his crop (Zembala 1995).   
 When describing Baltimore’s past, historians often r fer to the years between 
mid-1600s and mid-1700s as the “Empty Century.”  “Empty” because there were very 
few inhabitants along the banks of the Patapsco River, the mouth of which forms the now 
famous Baltimore Harbor.  A few structures existed within today’s Baltimore city limits, 
but for the most part the immediate area was a sparsely inhabited, dense wilderness 
(Olson 1980).  The terrain of the area was steeper than many other large Chesapeake Bay 
inlets.  Unlike the wide navigable streams near Annapolis and throughout Maryland’s 
Eastern Shore, a network of several rivers rushed down hilly valleys to the Patapsco 
River.  Located on the fall-line of the Appalachian Mountains, the topography of 
Baltimore falls approximately 700 feet in about seven miles.  These streams were not 
useful for an agrarian economy and the shipment of tobacco.  However, the cascading 
waters or “fells” would eventually prove ideal for hydraulic mills and power generation.  
The hydro-energy linked to Baltimore’s landscape and streams, though, would not be put 
to use until the 1770s, just a few years before the signing of America’s Declaration of 
Independence (Zembala 1995).             
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Even though much of Maryland was adequately situated for tobacco cultivation, 
eighteenth century farmers learned of the outstanding potential for corn and wheat 
production throughout the mid-Atlantic state.  But, unlike tobacco, corn and wheat do
need milling and processing.  Consequently, just a few miles to the west of present day 
Baltimore City lies the site of the state’s first major flour mill.  Established by three 
Quaker brothers hailing from Buck’s County (Pennsylvania), John, Andrew and Joseph 
Ellicott not only constructed a successful milling center, but also laid the foundations for 
a major agricultural and economical change for the Baltimore region.  In 1772, their 
“Ellicott Mill” was completed and the industrious trio of brothers began persuading 
nearby farmers to plant wheat instead of tobacco.  To enhance wheat production, the 
Ellicotts introduced fertilizer to revitalize the dpleted soil and Maryland’s agricultural 
practices were soon completely transformed (Howard 2007).  No longer would Baltimore 
be a small village in the midst of a picturesque wilderness. The completion of the 
flourmill, advancements and changes in agricultural methods, and the use of the area’s 
cascading waters marked the beginning of the industrialization of the city.   The use of 
the land’s unique topography helped generate the production of literally hundreds of 
milled and manufactured goods.   
A second major industrialization invention, the railroad, further strengthened 
Baltimore City and the Patapsco River port.  Many historians consider Baltimore a true 
American “City of Firsts,” and perhaps most distinguished on the list of early 
accomplishments is the development of the Baltimore and Ohio (B&O) railroad.  The 
B&O is recognized as being the first permanent rail system in the United States.     
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  The following list of  “firsts” is a testament tohow rapidly Baltimore grew as an 
industrial city: first dredger in the world (1783), first sugar refinery in the U.S. (1796), 
first electric refrigerator (1803), first manufacturers of silverware in the U.S. (1815), first 
American umbrella factory (1828), first railroad for commercial transportation of 
passengers and freight (1828), first coal burning steam locomotive (1830), first steamboat 
company (1840), first commercial stomach antacid seltzer (1891)—these are just a few 
from a list of many (Baltimore City 2007).  The complete list truly demonstrates just how 
the city grew to be one of the greatest manufacturing centers in the United States.  
  However, as with many of the American rustbelt cities, the industrial greatness 
of Baltimore began a downhill slide in the middle of the twentieth century.  Economic 
changes, mainly influenced by globalization of labor and racial/class motivated 
population shifts (Lazare 1991; Fisher 2007), have marked a fifty-plus year history of 
Baltimore’s downfall.  In 1950 the population of Baltimore City was 949,708— over one 
half of Maryland’s entire population (Planning 2000). The 2005 census estimates show 
Baltimore City having a total population of just 635,815, only a little over 10 percent of 
Maryland’s 2005 population estimate of 5,600,388 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).  One of 
the only glimmers of Baltimore’s past industrial greatness is the Baltimore Port; still 
economically vibrant, the port remains one of the Eastern seaboard’s top shipping and 
docking facilities.  Today, the Baltimore harbor facilities rank first nationally for roll-
on/roll-off cargo and the port is the second busiest in the nation for automobile importing 
and exporting (Scher and Barber 2006).  
However, even with the impressive port rankings, the legendary industrial and 
manufacturing sectors have, for the most part, vacated the shores of the mouth of the 
  
 - 39 - 
Patapsco River.  For example, General Motors capitalized on Baltimore’s geography and 
labor force and built a large automobile manufacturing facility in 1934.  As the 
automaker increased production throughout the twentieth century the Baltimore plant 
grew to encompass 160 acres.  At the peak of the facility’s production in 1979, the plant 
employed approximately 7000 workers (Zembala 1995).  With increased overseas 
competition, aging facilities, and decreased auto sales, GM completely closed the plant in 
2005 and the majority of the buildings in the complex were razed in the summer of 2006 
(Mirabella 2006). 
The history of Baltimore’s Bethlehem Steel Corporati n represents an even more 
dramatic example of the de-industrialization of the harbor city.  The steel company was 
situated on a massive 2500-acre harbor headland known as Sparrows Point.  By the late 
1950s Bethlehem’s Baltimore plant was the second largest steel mill in the county and 
employed 35,000 workers.  Throughout the United States, cities like Pittsburg, 
Youngstown, Philadelphia, and Allentown have seen st el mills close.  Following the 
national trend, Bethlehem Steel filed for bankruptcy in 2001 and the Baltimore plant 
closed.  Today, Sparrow’s point is nearly vacant and represents another of our nation’s 
massive brownfield sites (Moore 2004).   Figure 2 (below) captures not only the immense 
size of Bethlehem’s ship building yards, but also the vast industrial landscape of 
Baltimore.   
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Figure 2. The enormity of Bethlehem Steel and Baltimore's industrial landscape 
(with permission from the BMI 2006). 
 
At one time industrial workers comprised over 20 percent of Baltimore’s 
workforce.  By the early 1990s that number was less than 10 percent (Zembala 1995).  
The 2005 American Community Survey prepared by the U.S Census reports such 
workers to be less than 8 percent of the city’s population (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).  
The dramatic shrinking of Baltimore’s industrial workforce is a reflection of the city’s 
idle and abandoned industrial land.  Because of varying perceptions and definitions of a 
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brownfield site it has been difficult for city officials to exactly quantify the problem.   
Some experts estimate that the city is burdened with over 1000 vacant or underutilized 
industrial sites, and nearly half of those are larger than an acre in size (Litt and Burke 
2002). 
On a brighter note, even with staggering economic declines and decades of social 
strife, Baltimore has been re-emerging as a vibrant, diverse, and charismatic city (Vey 
2007).  The city has done extensive work on the innr harbor, which is considered a 
major tourism highlight of the Eastern Seaboard.  But what has happened to the millions 
of square feet of abandoned, blighted, and potentially contaminated industrial real estate 
left behind after the manufacturing sector left the city?  Countless vantage points 
throughout the Baltimore display a seemingly endless array of Victorian-era brick 
factories and warehouses.  The following two sections f this chapter will examine how 
two of the abandoned properties were transformed from industrial blight to showcase 
mixed-use properties.    
Montgomery Park 
Interstate 95 runs diagonally northeast through America’s “megalopolis,” the 
densely populated eastern seaboard expanse of seemingly continual cities and suburbs 
stretching from Washington D.C. to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City and Boston.   
On the southwest edge of Baltimore’s urban core, I-95 motorists cannot miss seeing 
Montgomery Park—a massive concrete art-deco structure, painted bright white.  
The former Montgomery Wards building was constructed in 1925 to be the 
catalog retailer’s behemoth east coast distribution center, warehouse, and regional retail 
store.  The eight-storey structure was built of poured concrete and boasted well over one-
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million square feet of usable space; making it the largest building in the state of Maryland 
(Delpizo 2006).  After more than a century of interationally successful mail order and 
large-scale storefront sales, Montgomery Wards’ profits declined sharply as America’s 
buying habits turned to shopping at mega-malls and away from catalog retailers.  By the 
mid-1980s, the retail giant had shrunk to only a handful of sparsely stocked stores.  In 
1989 Montgomery Wards filed for bankruptcy and ultimately closed its doors.  The 
downfall of Montgomery Wards left the prominent Baltimore retail and distribution 
facility a vacant eyesore on the western edge of the city.  The idle building typified 
Baltimore’s exorbitantly high commercial and industrial vacancies of the early and mid 
1990s.  To make matters worse, the building’s adjacency to the mid-Atlantic super-
highway, Interstate 95, served as a constant reminder to travelers of the urban blight, 
unemployment, and overall economic instability evermore haunting the former industrial 
power of Baltimore City. 
The Role of the Baltimore Development Corporation 
 In 1993, the BDC was established as a private organization dedicated to the 
recruitment of new, and the preservation of current, businesses in Baltimore.  The BDC 
receives approximately 80 percent of its funding from its one client, the City of 
Baltimore, making the group a quasi-governmental organization which is assigned the 
primary task of promoting and motivating businesses to take advantage of the financial 
opportunities present within Baltimore’s city limits.  New and maintained business 
growth means, of course, continuous and healthy tax income for the city’s governmental 
coffers (Brodie 2006). 
 A major early goal of BDC was the reuse of the gigantic vacant Wards building 
situated only blocks from downtown.  The group knew that the building could be a huge 
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source of income for the city if put to good use; but a fitting adaptation for such a 
monstrous and archaic building would be a sizable challenge.  The structure was within a 
crumbling neighborhood in a sector of the city burdened with high poverty and troubling 
crime rates.  The acreage and empty buildings had become an overwhelming tarnish in an 
already suffering urban zone.  Adding to its perils, the building was fraught with lead 
paint, asbestos and leaking storage tanks.  Cleaning facilities were tainted with chemical 
spills and an abandoned motor pool was saturated with petroleum (Metz 2001b).  The 
BDC knew it had to find and entice a creative develop r willing to take on such a high-
risk site (Brodie 2006).  Along with finding a developer, the BDC knew it would have to 
help lure tenants to the crime and poverty stigmatized neighborhood in which the Wards 
building was located.  
The Maryland Department of the Environment and a Redevelopment Initiative 
 The Maryland Department of the Environment is the state government agency 
dedicated to the oversight and management of the preservation of quality air, water, and 
soils within the state of Maryland.  The agency is charged with the administration and 
regulation of such things as incinerators, chemical plants, and the cleanup of any 
potentially toxic substances.  
 MDE’s mission is to protect and restore the quality of Maryland’s air, 
land, and water resources.  The agency does this while fostering economic 
development, healthy and safe communities, and quality environmental 
education for the benefit of the environment, public health, and future 
generations (MDE 2006a, 1). 
 
 Given Maryland’s dense population and strong industrial and agricultural 
heritage, such a mission is a monumental task, especially given the fact that Maryland is 
situated around the Chesapeake Bay, a delicate environmental treasure and world’s 
largest marine estuary.  This charter has caused the agency to grow tremendously 
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throughout its fifty-year history.  As outlined in Chapter III, in 1997 the Maryland State 
Legislature enacted legislation that called for the creation of a department within MDE to 
monitor and oversee the voluntary cleanup of brownfield sites.  With the addition of the 
new brownfields group, the agency became the workplace of nearly nine hundred 
Marylanders.   
In the late 1990s, MDE primarily occupied a facility just outside of Baltimore’s 
city limits and several small specialized buildings throughout the state.  Expanding 
oversight duties and increasing technology in the workplace created a need for either a 
major renovation of their headquarters or a move to a new facility.   Simply put, MDE 
had outgrown its facilities and the state budget would have to contend with the massive 
expenditure of updating or relocating the home of one f the state’s largest agencies.   A 
review of documents obtained from the Secretary of the Environment’s office indicated 
that moving, rather than updating, the headquarters would be tremendously expensive, 
but necessary, due to space and technology limitations and due to the fact that MDE’s 
rent for their existing facility had increased at a rate of 35 percent from FY1999 to FY 
2002 (Nishida 2002). 
With the need for a move clear, MDE released a Request For Proposal (RFP) in 
1999 to the general public indicating the search for a new building.  Parts of the 
document presumably read like many other such requests:  MDE was seeking to combine 
two field offices with current headquarters and would therefore need nearly 235,000 
square feet of office space, 23,000 square feet of heated warehouse/storage space, 
daycare facilities, a lunch room, and ample free parking for employees and visitors.  Any 
new building up for consideration would also need to meet a list of technology 
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requirements in order to accommodate the hundreds of computers and the lab equipment 
necessary for daily MDE operations.   
For the most part, this initial grocery list of requirements was spelled out like 
almost any request for a new building.  However, several points in the MDE request were 
unique to its situation.  Contained within the RFP was a great example of the MDE’s 
commitment to environmentally conscious development.   The document specifically 
stated that preference would be given to a “green” facility: “Preference will be given for 
the use of environmentally sound features and materials such as energy efficient lighting 
and HVAC systems, water conservation fixtures, use of r cycled materials, and any other 
pollution prevention or conservation features (MDE 1999, 2).”  The document continued 
with a statement indicating that the relocation criteria must be based on the “Governor’s 
Smart Growth Executive Order,” signifying that interested parties must refer both to the 
RFP and Governor Glendenning’s Smart Growth criteria in order to fully meet the site 
requirements of the RFP.   
 The Governor’s Smart Growth Executive Order outlined a list of both “required” 
and “priority” criteria.  For example, the verbiage under “requirements” of the executive 
order include phrases such as “revitalizing existing communities, improving the 
environment, and utilizing targeted State/Federal/Local capital funding,” and “location 
should preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, critical environmental areas, and 
reduce sprawl.”  It should also be noted that the RFP indicated that the search area lay 
within the “Baltimore Beltway,” an interstate highway pattern encircling the city limits of 
Baltimore (MDE 1999). 
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 The specific criteria set forth in the RFP made it possible for only four area 
properties to make the short list for consideration.  However, the review of various letters 
and departmental memoranda made it clear that the Gov rnor’s Office and the 
Department of Environment had their attention focused on the massive, vacant 
Montgomery Wards—a building ideally located only blocks from downtown and just off 
of Interstate 95.   
Simultaneous Efforts Lead to a Successful Project 
 Identifying one specific event that spurred the successful redevelopment of this 
particular brownfield is difficult to pinpoint.  Did the BDC set the Montgomery Park 
reuse project in motion by aggressively looking for a developer to negotiate with Wards 
officials in Chicago? Or, did the MDE see an opportunity to perpetuate smart growth 
initiatives and environmentally conscious development by reusing the former Wards site?  
It seems that both had to take place practically simultaneously in order to transform the 
site into the development success story enjoyed today by thousands of Marylanders.   
 In an interview with M.J. “Jay” Brodie of the BDC, it was pointed out that city 
transportation officials were eyeing the Montgomery Ward site for parking and 
maintenance of the city’s public transportation fleet.  The main structure would have to 
be demolished and about fifty city employees would work at the facility.  Mr. Brodie saw 
much greater potential for the Wards building and solicited several local developers to 
approach the ailing Montgomery Wards Corporation about selling their Baltimore real 
estate.  After several developers failed to come to t rms with Wards, Samuel Himmelrich, 
proprietor of Himmelrich and Associates, successfully negotiated a purchase of the site 
(Brodie 2006).  
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However, the size and condition of the building made conventional commercial 
financing too risky for traditional loan sources.  The redevelopment and financing 
challenges were further complicated by the fact that t e building contained a litany of 
environmental and health hazards.  The site would have to undergo extensive 
environmental assessment and cleanup to limit liability concerns and therefore qualify for 
any financing from banks and lenders.  One of the few motivating factors was the site’s 
location—close to downtown Baltimore and Interstate 95.  Yet, another plus on the side 
of the Wards building was the fact that the site also qualified for Maryland’s extremely 
favorable Historic Preservation Tax Credits and wassituated within a Federal 
Empowerment Community and a State Enterprise Zone—two more lucrative tax 
incentives.   
Still, however, the size, age, and contamination affecting the site practically made 
any groundbreaking reuse project financially out of reach.  Well aware of these hurdles, 
the City of Baltimore and its teammate, the BDC, worked with the USEPA to secure a $1 
million grant for initial site assessment and preliminary cleanup.   Along with the grant, 
the city secured an $8 million Housing and Urban Development (HUD) loan to be used 
as substantial seed money for the project.  Processing, administration, and servicing of 
the loan would be handled by BDC.  (Details on the $1 million grant and the $8 million 
HUD loan are described in the following section.) 
For initial construction and renovations to get underway, another $27 million  
would be needed.  Himmelrich found financing at lending giant Citibank, but bank 
underwriters would only grant the loan contingent upon the signing of at least one major 
new building tenant.  Herein, the circle becomes complete and in September of 2000, 
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Governor Parris Glendening announced the State had reached an agreement on a ten-year 
lease and would move the MDE headquarters to the Montgomery Park Business Center 
— the site of the former Montgomery Wards building  Southwest Baltimore (Office of 
the Governor 2000).  
This announcement signified more than the relocation of a government agency —
the MDE move was a culmination of private development, a quasi-government 
corporation, municipal government, state agencies, gubernatorial initiative, tax 
incentives, and federal grants and loans.  These groups and initiatives all worked together 
to turn an abandoned eyesore into a successful commercial site and home to literally 
thousands of Baltimore employees.   Along with providing an economic boon for the city 
of Baltimore, the Montgomery Ward Business Park exemplifies modern environmentally 
“green” building practices.  A letter from the governor’s office to a Maryland House 
Delegate touches on a few of the environmental amenities of the reused structure. 
Specifically, Montgomery Park perfectly fit the Governor's Smart Growth 
Initiative and Neighborhood Conservation Policy as it i in an Enterprise 
Zone, Empowerment Zone and is a Brownfields development site.  The 
green building attributes include 75% waste minimization during the 
deconstruction/construction phase, 50% savings in energy cost, 33% 
savings in lighting cost (day lighting sensors, low mercury fluorescent 
bulbs), 50% reduction in storm-water runoff, low water/rainwater 
bathroom fixtures, a green vegetative roof, zero/low VOC sealants, and 
workstations containing mostly recycled and sustainable materials and 
100% recycled carpet (Nishida 2002, 1). 
 
Today, the Montgomery Wards Warehouse and Retail store is still owned by the 
development firm, Himmelrich and Associates, who has n med the building complex 
“Montgomery Park.”  The adaptive reuse of the 1925 structure is approximately 75 
percent leased with tenants including MDE, state lott ry offices, a major bank processing 
center, a health club, insurance services, a collection agency, a food court, and an interior 
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architecture firm (Delpizo 2006). The following parag aph, taken from the Montgomery 
Park internet site, succinctly describes the state of he building today: 
The landmark Montgomery Ward Catalog House is becoming a place 
where entrepreneurs celebrate healthy commerce, businesses thrive in 
flexible space and the spirit of productivity abounds. Conjured from a 
former industrial shell, Montgomery Park is a powerful model for 
innovative development. It unveils the hidden potential of an historic 
landmark, embodies a vision for ecologically minded r vitalization, 
supports a vibrant urban core and is a crucible for c nomic growth 
(MontgomeryPark 2006, 1). 
 
Figure 3 shows Montgomery Park as it exists after millions of dollars of 
remediation and updating.  Details about the multiple local, state, and federal roles in the 
rehabilitation of the site are described in the following sub-section. 
Figure 3. Montgomery Park as a modern office building (photo by author). 
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The Third Factor: Federal Public Subsidy  
 It is recognized that brownfield sites are often not on a level playing field when 
compared to undeveloped land (greenfields) (Siegal and Meyer 2007).  In the case of 
Montgomery Park, Himmelrich and Associates were confronted with the removal of 
underground storage tanks, soil remediation, and elimination of millions of square feet of 
chipped and pealing lead-based paint.  It was estimated that the steep upfront site cleanup 
costs and the desired use of environmentally consciu  building systems left 
Montgomery Park with a financing gap of $8 million (Paull 2007).   
In addition to environmental cleanup and green building design costs, 
Montgomery Park was located in an underutilized industrial neighborhood.  Many of the 
surrounding land parcels were vacant and nearby residential neighborhoods were areas of 
significant blight, vacant buildings, low property values, and real and/or perceived high 
rates of crime. The project, as is typical in many brownfield sites, presented costs and 
hurdles not generally encountered on undeveloped, gr enfield, sites. 
 Recognizing the additional challenges and the $8 million financing disparity the 
BDC sought to aggregate a multitude of public subsidie .   At the top of the list was 
Baltimore City’s creative use of HUD section 108 funds.  Housing and Urban 
Development section 108 funds are loans made available to localities for the purpose of 
community development.  The economic stimulus tool was developed in the early 1990s 
and, throughout the decade, over $4 billion in community development investments was 
supported with Section 108 funding (Walker et al. 200 ).   Municipalities are able to 
borrow up to five times their annual entitlement to C mmunity Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) funds.  However, the major caveat to using HUD 108 loan funds is that the 
city’s future CDBG funding is used as collateral (Walker et al. 2002).  City Housing 
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Officials were reluctant to place federal grant dollars in jeopardy and concerns over the 
stability of the Montgomery Park project generated months of negotiations, but an 
extremely creative solution made the loan possible (Paull 2007).  The following list 
paraphrases the creative “deal” struck between BDC and city officials to mitigate the risk 
of losing valuable CDBG funding if Montgomery Park went into default on the HUD 
section 108 loan: 
• First, the $1 million HUD grant awarded to the project (see below) was 
retained in an interest reserve account 
• A second lien for the amount of the HUD 108 loan was placed on the 
property.  The security for the lien was equity based on a “subject to 
completion” appraised value. (Once completed it wasestimated that the 
property would be worth several times the initial purchase price.) 
• The developer committed to a $2 million personal guaranty 
• A $6 million debt service reserve account was establi hed.  The account 
was funded from net income after payments were made to the first 
mortgage, HUD 108 debt service, and 3% return to tax credit investors.  
Distributions to the developer for return on investment (up to 25% of true 
equity) occur only after the debt service reserve account reaches $6 million 
• City Economic Development Loan funds were pledged as a final backdrop 
of security (Paull 2007) 
   
The $1 million funding from HUD came from a Brownfields and Economic 
Development Initiative (BEDI) grant.  Brownfields and Economic Development Initiative 
grants piggyback on HUD 108 loans to help provide stimulus for brownfields reuse 
projects that have a focus on establishing economic pportunities to low- and moderate- 
income persons. As was done with Montgomery Park, BEDI funds are usually used to 
enhance the security or to improve the viability of a project financed with a HUD section 
108 loan (HUD 2006).   
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The financing structure behind the redevelopment of M ntgomery Wards 
involved many levels of governmental and private sector cooperation.  Fortunately, 
Maryland’s smart growth incentives also contained favorable tax credits that, 
presumably, made the complicated project well worth the developer’s efforts. 
The State Subsidies: Tax Credits and Brownfields Incentives 
The timing of the redevelopment of Montgomery Park made it possible for the 
developer to capitalize on the most lucrative histor c tax credit structure ever offered by 
the state of Maryland.  In 1999, as part of the Governor’s push for smart growth, the state 
legislature approved a generous amendment to the state’s historic tax credit.  The 
amendment, which stayed on the books for only two years, provided developers with a 25 
percent, uncapped, refundable credit for rehabilitation costs.  For Montgomery Park this 
amounted to $16.2 million dollars (Sams 2007a).   
The last innovative smart growth concept program Montg mery Park participated 
in was Maryland’s BRIP.  The Brownfields Revitalization Incentive Program, 
administered by the Maryland Department of Business and Economic Development, 
granted a $2 million dollar below market rate loan to the project.  Table 1 outlines all of 
the public financial incentives utilized by the developer on Montgomery Park:  
Table 1. Layers of public financing and tax incentives for Montgomery Park. 
Type of Incentive/Public Subsidy Amount 
Maryland Historic Tax Credits $16.2 (used as security for BRIP loan) 
Maryland BRIP Loan $2 million (below market rate) 
Maryland Brownfields Tax Credits Converted to $16 million in equity 
Federal HUD Section 108 Loan $8 million 
Maryland BEDI Grant $1 million 
Federal Empowerment Zone Loan $4.5 million 
Private Lender Financing $27 million 
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 The multiple layers of financing required for the reclamation of Montgomery Park 
demonstrate how intricate and complicated it can be to finance relatively large-scale 
brownfield sites.  The project capitalized on nearly $32 million in state and federal loan 
and subsidy programs.  In addition, the project requir d and great deal of time and effort 
from BDC and Baltimore City staff, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to place a dollar-
value on their essential role.  At the time of its completion, the project represented the 
largest combination of public agency efforts Maryland has ever seen in re-using a 
brownfield (Brodie 2006).   Chapter V of this thesis helps begin to quantify whether or 
not the multi-tiered efforts behind Montgomery Park e paying off with a positive 
impact on the surrounding neighborhood and the city’s tax base.   Preceding the 
quantitative analysis, the following section takes an in-depth look at the second case 
study site for this thesis, Tide Point. 
Tide Point 
Baltimore’s Industrial Harbor: the Proctor and Gamble Site 
Geographically and historically significant to Baltimore, Fells Point and Locust 
Point jut from opposite sides into the wide, navigable Patapsco River to create one of the 
most vibrant and recognizable attractions to Baltimore— the city’s Inner Harbor.  The 
Inner Harbor is a true urban redevelopment success story that began in the mid 1970s 
when city officials successfully transformed a waterfront of decaying docks and 
warehouses to high-end hotels, shops, city aquarium, science center, and several 
historical attractions.   Too small and shallow for modern shipping needs, the uppermost 
reaches of Baltimore’s Harbor became virtually abandoned early in the twentieth century 
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when deeper draft and larger docking facilities were stablished further down the 
Patapsco.  
Today, the industrial buildup Baltimore’s Harbor starts several miles away from 
downtown at the mouth of the Patapsco River where it merges with the Chesapeake Bay.   
Industrial facilities run essentially unbroken until the waterfront pinnacle at Locust Point.  
With very little exception, every inch of the main “Middle Branch” of the Patapsco River 
shoreline has been built up with industrial sites, commercial buildings, docks, and 
machinery.  
 Directly across from Baltimore’s historic Fells Point, on the largest and most 
formidable jetty of Locust Point, is the regional headquarters and iconic Baltimore 
landmark, Domino Sugars.  From wherever the skyline of downtown is visible, so too is 
the regionally famous Domino Sugar sign.  The lighted billboard is a massive testament 
to Baltimore’s legacy of industry and acts as beacon delineating the stylish redeveloped 
Inner Harbor from the still industrialized main Baltimore Harbor.  The sign itself is the 
size of a football field (literally) and requires a full time electrician to maintain (Zembala 
1995).  Looking from the Inner Harbor beyond Domino Sugars a Baltimore visitor can 
see huge storage tanks, freight ships, and massive cran s. 
 The first set of buildings in the shadow of Domino Sugar’s sign is a grouping of 
six brick structures—the former soap production facilities of Proctor and Gamble.   The 
Proctor and Gamble plant, constructed in 1929, originally consisted of fifteen buildings 
on a seven and one half acre site.  By the early 1980s, Proctor and Gamble’s Baltimore 
operations had added another seventeen acres of land and erected twelve additional 
buildings.  The plant’s greatest expansions took place in the late 1940s and again in 1967.  
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By 1979 the Locust Point facility was employing approximately 550 men and woman 
(McQuaid and Lippman 1995) and paid out over $70 million to the Baltimore economy 
in fiscal year 1981.  The local plant produced list of familiar brand name soaps— Camay, 
Ivory, Tide, Cheer, Oxydol, Bold, Gain, Joy, Downy, Cascade and others (White 1981).  
 As late as 1989 Proctor and Gamble continued to upgrade and renovate the 
industrial complex, but in 1990 the Baltimore plant reduced its workforce to 300.  In 
1993 the Proctor and Gamble Corporation announced a $1.7 billion consolidation of 
facilities and the closure of thirty plants worldwide.  Less than a year later, on January 
13, 1994, the closing of the Locust Point plant wasannounced; by September the doors 
were closed and the final 215 employees vacated the property.  After steadily operating 
for sixty-five years, the waterfront manufacturing plant became another one of many 
vacant industrial sites pock-marking Baltimore City (McQuaid and Lippman 1995). 
The Transformation  
While the history and location of Tide Point is a bit more colorful story than that 
of Montgomery Park, the site’s evolution from vacant brownfield to successful 
redevelopment is substantially less complicated.  The developers, Struever Bros. Eccles 
and Rouse (Struever Bros.), were able to obtain private financing for both the purchase 
and remediation costs, avoiding many of the intricae l yers of public financing 
associated with Montgomery Park ( Nieman 2006; Paull 2007).  However, the savvy 
development firm did capitalize on millions of dollars worth of tax incentives bundled by 
Maryland’s Smart Growth initiatives and the federal government.   
 Struever Bros. had already gained experience on the redevelopment of industrial 
site projects with the completion of the American-Can site in 1997 (Paull 2005).  The 
early brownfields project, located across the Baltimore harbor from Tide Point, was a 
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former beer-can manufacturing facility turned into a mixed-use office and retail complex. 
However, the American Can project was completed before the inception of the Maryland 
Brownfields Tax credit, and the work at Tide Point marked the first project to take 
advantage of the state’s rewarding tax incentive  (Paull 2005).   
Struever Bros. also saw opportunity in Maryland’s extr mely favorable historic 
rehabilitation tax credit.  As with Montgomery Park, Struever Bros filed for the tax credit 
during the relatively short period of time that historic property developers were able to 
deduct 25 percent of all rehabilitation costs.  At Tide Point this translated into $17.7 
million dollars (Sams 2007b).  In subsequent years the state legislature reeled in the 
lucrative incentive to 20 percent and capped the total benefit to $3 million per project 
(Preservation 2007).  The amount of historically conscious redevelopment work, 
combined with good timing, helps the Tide Point project stand as the largest historic tax 
credit benefactor ever in the state of Maryland (Sams 2007b; Trust 2007). 
 According to the project manager, Struever Bros. had little concern of potential 
industrial contaminants (Neiman 2006).  Environmental consultants had convinced the 
firm that Proctor and Gamble’s periodic upgrades and the modern soap manufacturing 
procedures left the site relatively free of long-term environmental concerns.  
Nevertheless, Struever Bros. elected to pay for not o e, but two applications to the 
Maryland VCP, at a cost of $6000 each, just for the application.  Initially, the developers 
applied to remediate the buildings for an end use of office space and/or commercial 
Planned Urban Development.  However, after site testing and initial remediation, the 
developers decided to include a child daycare facility in one of the buildings.  This 
required the Struever Bros withdraw several sections of land from their original VCP 
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application and prepare a second application to the VCP in which the end use of the 
property could be for residential and/or daycare, a designation which carries a more 
stringent cleanup standard. 
 The developers were fortunate to find very low levels of soil and groundwater 
contamination on the site.  The site assessment report indicated that, “The results from 
the data provided indicate that there is no potential increased risk from exposure to 
contaminants in the surface and subsurface soils throug  incidental ingestion, inhalations 
of volatiles and fugitive dust or dermal contact (Mank 2001, 7).”          
As with Montgomery Park, the ownership and management of the Tide Point 
buildings has remained with the developer, Struever Bros.  The six buildings offer a total 
of 400,000 leasable square feet, and the office complex contains work space for 
approximately 1600 people (Neiman 2006). Along with S ruever Bros.’ headquarters, 
Tide Point is home to law offices, architecture firms, and Under Armor, the super-
successful, Maryland owned and operated, line of sprt  apparel. The following 
descriptions of the current facilities at Tide Point capture the high level of innovation 
employed by Struever Bros when transforming the soap factory, and why so many high 
profile businesses call the former Proctor and Gamble plant home.   
Tide Point offers amenities designed to encourage interaction among like-
minded companies and to provide an opportunity to work and play in one 
of the most spectacular settings on Baltimore’s waterfront. Amenities 
include: 
 Tide Point Day Care Center –A contemporary, 22,000 square 
foot daycare center for children six weeks to five years of age. The 
state-of-the-art center is operated by the Board of Child Care. 
 Tide Point Athletic Club  – A fully-appointed corporate fitness 
center operated by Merritt Athletic Clubs, Tide Point’s athletic 
club offers circuit weight training, an aerobic studio, wellness 
assessments and programs, and massage therapy in the Tide 
Building. 
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 Harvest Table – Harvest Table provides light fare breakfast, 
lunch, dinner and catering services in an architecturally distinct 
building that provides free WI-Fi access to meet th c allenges of 
doing business in today’s digital age. 
 Tide Point Waterfront Park  - Baltimore’s public promenade has 
extended to Tide Point, giving people another exciting location to 
enjoy harbor views. 
 Water Taxi Transportation  – With regular stops at Tide Point, 
two water taxi operators command a fleet of US Coast Guard 
certified passenger boats serving Baltimore's beautiful Inner 
Harbor. 
 “Chill Out” Room – This ground floor location  
in the Tide Building is a place for employees and members of the 
athletic club to relax. With an outdoor patio and views of the 
harbor, the space boasts comfortable furniture and l rge screen TV. 
 Canton Kayak Club - With dockage at Tide Point for paddle 
sports enthusiasts, the club provides a common ground for sharing 
information, ideas, good judgment, and promoting the safe 
enjoyment of the sport (TidePoint 2005, 1). 
 
These amenities represented a model for high-end brownfields redevelopment projects 
that have taken place over the past decade (Neiman 2006).  With this type of 
development it is understandable why it might be possible for one brownfield site to 
engender a ripple effect and positively influence th  surrounding neighborhood. 
At Tide Point, the developer was able to successfully transform a series of vacant 
buildings, potentially laced with industrial health hazards into first-rate office space and 
childcare facility.  The success of the project was precipitated by several major provisions 
of Maryland’s Smart Growth Policies.  Specifically, the assurance of liability relief 
provided through the VCP and attractive historic and brownfields tax credits.   In short, 
Tide Point exemplified the fact that state policies had made top quality urban reuse 
projects possible, even without the significant public financing and partnerships (as were 
needed to redevelop Montgomery Park).    
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Tide Point (Figures 4-6) and Montgomery Park highlit the fact that public 
policies had been effective in creating a climate ideal for the redevelopment of urban sites 
previously considered too expensive or risky.  But, did the projects have a significant 
impact on the surrounding neighborhood?  In the following chapter this thesis quantifies 
the influence of both Tide Point and Montgomery Park on the areas immediately 
surrounding each project. 
 
Figure 4. Rejuvenated Tide Point facing Baltimore's Inner Harbor (photo by 
author) 
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Figure 5. Industry still exists right next to Tide Point (photo by author) 
 
Figure 6. Daycare facilities at Tide Point (photo by author) 
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V. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
What has happened to the neighborhoods surrounding the two sites?  Baltimore is 
a city of neighborhoods.  The city limits are broken into roughly 275 distinct 
neighborhoods, each with its own character, identity, neighborhood association, etc. 
(LiveBaltimore 2007).  This chapter looks at the tax assessment values, sal  records, and 
permit data for the two neighborhoods in which the case study sites are located: 
Montgomery Park in the Carroll-Camden neighborhood an Tide Point in the Locust 
Point neighborhood.    
Current Full Cash Value FY1995, FY2001,FY 2007 
As shown in the following table (Table 2), the 2007 the tax assessed value or 
CFCV for the main parcel of land identified with Montgomery Park (Lot 001A; Block 
0731) increased significantly in FY2007. 
Table 2. Current Full Cash Value for main tax parcel of Montgomery Park 
Montgomery Park (Lot 001A; Block 0731) 
Year Land Improvement Total CFCV 
1995 $1,137,710 $3,143,760 $4,218,470 
2001 $1,137,000 $2,381,100 $3,518,100 
2007 $1,624,300 $44,259,500 $45,833,800 
 
In 2007 the CFCV for the 16.24 acre parcel totaled $45,833,800 (land value of 
$1,624,300 and improvements of $44,259,500).  In the dataset for 2001, the full transfer 
of the property to Himmelrich and Associates had not yet taken place and the certificates 
of occupancy had not yet been granted when the tax assessment appraisal was completed.  
That same parcel, just six years earlier (2001) was assessed with a total CFCV of 
$3,518,100 (land value of $1,137,000 and improvements value of $2,381,100).  In 1995, 
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when the owner of record for the same parcel was “998 Monroe Corporation” and the 
property was vacant, the total CFCV was $4,218,470 (land value of $1,137,710 and 
improvements value of $3,143,760).  Over the six year period of vacancy from 1995 to 
2001—two tax assessment cycles—the value of the vacated Montgomery Wards building 
dropped 16.6 percent.  In the next six year period the value of the parcel increased by 
over 1302 percent! 
The findings for the entire neighborhood (Figure 8, page 65) mirror the sixteen 
acre Montgomery Wards parcel.  In 1995 the total CFCV for the Carroll-Camden 
Industrial neighborhood was $139,690,740 for 196 taxed parcels (mean value of 
$712,707).  In 2001 the total CFCV dropped 4.6 percent to $133,244,530 for 202 taxed 
parcels (mean value of $659,626).  However, after th  completed remediation and reuse 
of the Montgomery Wards building, the CFCV increased 64.5 percent to $206,512,400 
for 202 tax parcels (mean value of 1,022,338).  Obviously the Montgomery Park parcel 
significantly contributed to the increase, but even after subtracting out Montgomery 
Park’s assessed value, the neighborhood garnered a significant value increase.  From 
1995 to 2001, the total value of the neighborhood waned substantially, but after 
Montgomery Park was completed and occupied, the entire eighborhood had a net 
(without Montgomery Park) increase in assessed value of $18,434,070, or 13.8 percent.  
According to tax records, the main parcel of land ecompassing the former 
Proctor and Gamble Soap manufacturing facilities wajust less than 10 acres (9.476). 
Similar to the Montgomery Ward site, the Tide Point tax parcel soared precipitously after 
the redevelopment was complete (Table 3).  
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Table 3. Tax assessed value of tax parcel occupied by Tide Point 
Tide Point (Lot 001; Block 1976) 
Year Land Improvement Total CFCV 
2007 9,746,000 40,404,900 50,150,900 
2001 2,436,500 1,418,300 3,854,800 
1995 3,396,290 2,919,050 6,315,340 
 
In 1995, the site was still being taxed as an industrial/manufacturing facility and 
the total CFCV was relatively high at $6,315,340 ($3,396,290 land value and $2,929,050 
improvement value). As noted in previous sections, Proctor and Gamble actually closed 
the plant in 1994, but presumably, the tax appraisal was still valuing the site as an 
industrial facility— a property type that earns a sizeable tax value.  Proctor and Gamble 
was still showing as the owner 1995 even though, during that same year an alcohol 
distilling company was in the process of purchasing the facilities with the intention of 
maintaining the site as an industrial production plant (Murray 1998).  The distillery idea 
was evidently short-lived and the site actually signif cantly decreased in value over the 
next six years.  By 2001 Struever Bros. had done significant work on the site and 
obtained a letter of No Further Action from the state environmental agency.  However, 
the building was not yet occupied by tenants, and no lo ger classified as an “industrial 
site.”  Therefore, in the 2001 assessment the CFCV was valued 6.2 percent less at 
$14,809,700 (land $9,742,200 and improvements of $5,067,500).  In 2007, when work 
was finished and the buildings were fully leased, the total CFCV of the Tide Point parcel 
more than tripled to $50,150,900 ($9,746,000 land and $40,404,900 in improvements). 
The significance of the Tide Point project becomes even more apparent when 
analyzing the CFCV valuation of the entire Locust Point neighborhood.  In 1995, a 
relative highpoint for the site’s value, the total CFCV for Locust Point was $317,690,380 
(mean value of $277,701).  In 2001, the Locust Point neighborhood was suffering from 
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the impacts of the plant closings and the Struever Bros. project was not yet occupied, 
consequently the total CFCV valuation dropped nearly 30 percent to $223,173,840 (mean 
value of $189,130). However, in the six years betwen 2001 and 2007 the Proctor and 
Gamble factory buildings were transformed into “Tide Point” and the complex reached 
full occupancy (Neiman 2006); thus by 2007 the CFCV more than doubled (52 percent) 
over 2001 to $460,866,670 (mean value of $358,372).  The 2007 CFCV numbers were 31 
percent higher than the 1995 total neighborhood CFCV for 1995.   Apparently, even 
without the city coffer enjoying the high tax rates of a productive manufacturing plant, 
Tide Point was contributing to an overall boost in neighborhood tax values.   
The property CFCV valuations (Figure 7) show that te reuse of both sites 
provided a significant windfall to Baltimore’s tax rolls.  Even though productive 
industrial facilities do carry a high value— sometimes substantially greater than office 
complexes or mixed-use properties— it is unlikely that the sites would have been reused 
as manufacturing facilities (Brodie 2006).  Figure 8 shows the aggregate tax value of both 
neighborhoods decreased in 2001, but had notable incr ases in 2007.   Most notably, the 
Locust Point tax value increased more than enough to make up for the loss of the local 
industry.   
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Figure 7. Tax assessed value of each case study site. 
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Figure 8. Aggregate tax assessed values for surroundi g neighborhoods. 
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Actual sales data 
In 1995 the Carroll-Camden neighborhood had eleven property transfers, two of 
which were “non-arms-length” transactions with no record of sales price (i.e., not sold on 
open market; transferred between parties with common interests and little or no cash was 
exchanged as part of the transaction).  The nine arms-length (fair market) transactions 
totaled $7,366,740 for an average sales price of $669,703.  In 2001 the primarily 
industrial neighborhood recorded 28 real estate transfers, of which fourteen were non-
arms-length.  The total value of arms-length sales wa $8,194,752, which translates into 
an average sales price of $682,895.  In the final ye r of data captured, FY2007, the 
neighborhood witnessed only five transactions, all of which were deemed arms-length.  
The five records boasted a total volume of $7,570,00  and an average of $1,514,000.   
In Locust Point, a neighborhood consisting of high-density attached residential, 
commercial, and heavy and light industrial properties, 1995 records indicate ninety-seven 
property transfers.  Of the ninety-seven transfers, thirty-six were considered non-arms-
length transactions.  The remaining sixty-one sales had a total sales volume of $3,585,873 
and an average, arms-length sale price, of $58,785.  In 2001, Locust Point real estate 
activity amassed 182 records of transfer; seventy-nine on-arms-length and 103 arms-
length.  The total arms-length volume of FY2001 was $11,410,221 and the sales average 
was $111,805. FY 2007, not exactly a banner year for real estate nationwide, the number 
of sales in Locust Point dropped to eighty-three—all of which were deemed arms-length-
transactions.  However, those eighty three sales generated $22,960,762 in volume and an 
average sales price of $276,635.   Table 4, below, summarizes the sales records for the 
three years compared. 
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Table 4. Sales data for the two case study neighborhoods 
FY1995 FY2001 FY2007 
Sales 
Records 
# 
Total 
Volume 
Ave. 
Price  # 
Total 
Volume 
Ave. 
Price # 
Total 
Volume 
Ave. 
Price 
 
Carroll 
Camden 9 7,366,740 669,703 14 8,194,752 682,895 5 7,570,000 1,514,000 
 
Locust 
Point 61 3,585,873 58,785 103 11,410,221 111,805 83 22,960,762 276,635 
 
The following graph, Figure 9, illustrates the change in average sales prices 
(Table 4) over the reviewed time periods.    Even though both areas had fewer sales in 
FY2007 than previous years compared, both neighborhoods have witnessed significant 
increases in average sales price. 
 
Figure 9. Bar graphs representing the increase in average sales price for each 
neighborhood 
 The graph above highlights the significant increases witnessed by the two 
neighborhoods.  Throughout the last decade, homeownrs throughout much of the county 
have seen significant value increases.  The national average of homes actually sold in 
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1995 was $157,750.  The national average sales price increased by 33.8 percent from 
1995 to $211,050 in 2001 and by another 46.1 percent from 2001 to 2007 when the 
average sold price was $308,275 (Economagic 2008).   
In Carroll-Camden the percent increase from 1995 to 2001 was only 1.97 percent.  
However, from 2001 to 2007 the industrial neighborho d outpaced even the large 
national average increase with a tremendous value rise of 121.7 percent.  The percentages 
for Locust Point demonstrate a much more immediate increase in values.  From 1995 to 
2001 the neighborhood outpaced the national trend and the average sales price (for both 
residential and commercial) increased 90.2 percent.    From 2001 to 2007 the average 
sales price for all property types surged by 147.4 percent. 
Permit Data 
The tax data convincingly argue that Baltimore’s appr isers were assigning higher 
values to both Carroll-Camden and Locust Point neighborhoods and the sales records 
support neighborhood-wide appreciation.  But how much more investment was actually 
going into the two neighborhoods?  After all, many reas of the country have seen 
property value appreciation simply due to residential inflation.  In some cases 
neighborhood values increase with very little additional investment into the actual 
properties.  In other words, tax and market values may go up but there are actually very 
few “new” dollars being invested in an area.  Analysis of permit data attempts to capture 
how the general citizens perceive an area:  Is the average homeowner or small builder 
willing to invest real cash into an area in hopes that values will increase? 
Permit data are by no means a perfect model of neighborhood investment, but an 
overview of permitted work done within an area does allude to overall activity.  
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Obviously, not all property owners will obtain permits for work on their property, but 
presumably the percentage of “honest,” permit-obtaining owners is relatively consistent 
from year to year.  Therefore, comparing three snaphots in time of permits pull will 
illuminate tangible investment into a neighborhood.   
 
Table 5. Total permits and total estimated value of improvements. 
1995 2001 2007 
 
 
 
# Permit 
Requests 
$ total 
estimated 
project 
costs 
# Permit 
Requests 
$ total 
estimated 
project 
costs 
# Permit 
Requests 
$ total 
estimated 
project 
costs 
Locust 
Point 
118 $695,836 368 $25,663,597 684 $76,259,689 
Carroll 
Camden 
58 $247,550 63 $769,582 65 $7,511,259 
 
The building permit numbers (Table 5) are very convincing for Tide Point.  As 
Proctor and Gamble was pulling out of Locust Point—a neighborhood with 
approximately 1250 parcels— only 118 requests for permits were recorded by city 
officials.  However in the months that Struever Bros. was completing Tide Point (FY 
2001), the requests more than tripled to 368.  The total estimated project costs associated 
with these permits soared from $695,836 in 1995 to $25,663,597 in 2001.  In the last 
dataset, FY 2007, the gains in neighborhood investmn  was equally impressive.  The 684 
permits obtained in FY2007 indicated a whopping investment of $76,259,689 into the 
Locust Point neighborhood. 
The numbers (Table 5) are not as convincing in the Carroll-Camden area, but the 
permit requests can be looked at as encouraging.  Carroll-Camden is only comprised of 
195 tax parcels, which makes it difficult to gauge trends of investment.  At first glance, 
the permit requests appear to be low in all three years, but the data show noticeable dollar 
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value increases. In 1995 permitted work accounted for only $247,550; but by the time 
Montgomery Park was finished, contractors were requesting permits valued at over $7.5 
million. 
As isolated numbers, the permit data do very little to determine whether or not 
investment was increasing because of a rejuvenated brownfield site.  Therefore, it is 
import to analyze what the permit activity means in relation to the entire city.  The 
following sections discuss how the use of location quotients puts the above numbers into 
perspective with all of Baltimore.     
Location Quotients  
Case Study Neighborhoods 
For this analysis the number of permits filed citywide to the number of permits 
pulled in each neighborhood is compared.  As discussed in Chapter III (Methodology), if 
the LQ was equal to “1.0” the neighborhood would have had the same activity (number 
of permits pulled per tax parcel) as the entire city; the higher the number above “1.0,” the 
greater the permit activity for the neighborhood in relation to Baltimore as a whole.   The 
table on the following page (Table 6) outlines the permit data LQ for each neighborhood.  
The numbers of permit requests and the location quotients (Table 6) indicate a 
rise in neighborhood investment/building activity.  Both neighborhoods had rates of 
building permit activity that substantially outpaced the city as a whole.  Therefore, even 
though the tax value of Tide Point decreased drastic lly after 1995 (Figures 7 and 8) the 
increase in permit activity (Table 5) and the high location quotients for permits in the 
surrounding neighborhood (Table 6) suggest that Baltimore was achieving a substantial 
overall economic gain because of the redevelopment of the site(s). 
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Table 6. Location quotient information derived from building permit data. 
# Neighborhood Permits # Citywide Permits Location Quotient 
(formula) 
= 
# Neighborhood Tax Parcels  
÷ 
# Citywide Tax Parcels 
  
Locust Point Permit Data Location Quotient 
118 Locust Point Permits 22018 Citywide Permits 1995 
LQ 1.02 
= 
1227 Locust Point Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233473 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
368 Locust Point Permits 20130 Citywide Permits 2001 
LQ 3.45 
= 
1266 Locust Point Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233260 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
684 Locust Point Permits 39327 Citywide Permits 2007 
LQ 3.33 
= 
1227 Locust Point Tax Parcels  
÷ 
235380 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
Carroll-Camden Permit Data Location Quotient 
58 Carroll-Camden Permits 22018 Citywide Permits 1995 
LQ 2.83 
= 
191 Carroll-Camden Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233473 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
63 Carroll-Camden Permits 20130 Citywide Permits 2001 
LQ 3.74 
= 
195 Carroll-Camden Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233260 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
65 Carroll-Camden Permits 39327 Citywide Permits 2007 
LQ 1.99 
= 
195 Carroll-Camden Tax Parcels  
÷ 
235380 Citywide Tax Parcels 
  
Example of Control Neighborhoods: Poppleton and Holabird 
In order to establish a mechanism for control, the methodology used to calculate a 
LQ for case study neighborhoods was applied to two neighborhoods with similar 
characteristics (number of tax parcels, proximity to central business district (CBD), and 
proximity to water).  However, the control neighborh ods did not have properties that 
had entered into Maryland’s VCP.  Of the 272 recognized Baltimore neighborhoods (a 
combination of 225 residential and 47 commercial/industrial) 29 contain sites that applied 
to the VCP. 
With 1392 tax parcels, the Poppleton neighborhood is very close in size to Locust 
Point and a similar distance from the CBD.  In 1995 there were 85 permit requests filed 
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with the city, compared to 118 in Locust Point.  In 2001, when Locust Point property 
owners requested over 400 permits, Poppleton only had 47 requests.  In 2007 Poppleton 
property owners filed for 91 permits; Locust Point witnessed 681 requests, over seven 
and one half times the number from Poppleton. 
Table 7. Location quotients for a single control neighborhood, Poppleton. 
Poppleton Permit Data Location Quotient 
85 Poppleton Permits 22018 Citywide Permits 1995 
LQ 0.82 
= 
1100 Poppleton Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233473 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
47 Poppleton Permits 20130 Citywide Permits 2001 
LQ 0.40 
= 
1392 Poppleton Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233260 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
91 Poppleton Permits 39327 Citywide Permits 2007 
LQ 0.43 
= 
1278 Poppleton Tax Parcels  
÷ 
235380 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
Holabird Industrial Park has similar traits as Carroll-Camden (i.e., mix of 
commercial and industrial properties), and similarly Holabird has a relatively small 
number of tax parcels with 107 in 1995 (Carroll-Camden had 196 in 1995).  As with 
Carroll-Camden, Holabird is very close to the CBD, and in 1995 (prior to Maryland’s 
Smart Growth policies) both neighborhoods made permit requests at a similar rate.  In 
1995, Carroll-Camden made 68 requests for 196 parcels (34.7 percent rate), and Holabird 
made 51 requests for 107 parcels (47.6 percent rate).  It is worth noting, however, that 
Holabird has the added attractiveness of actually being on the water.  Although, with no 
brownfields reuse projects undertaken in the immediat  area, the neighborhood only 
applied for 31 permits in 2001 and 35 in 2007.  Even thought the LQs are rather high, 
unlike Carroll-Camden, Holabird’s permit activity actually declined in 2001 and 2007.    
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Table 8. Location quotients for a single control neighborhood, Holabird 
Holabird Permit Data Location Quotient 
51 Holabird Permits 22018 Citywide Permits 1995 
LQ 5.05 
= 
107 Holabird Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233473 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
31 Holabird Permits 20130 Citywide Permits 2001 
LQ 3.36 
= 
107 Holabird Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233260 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
35 Holabird Permits 39327 Citywide Permits 2007 
LQ 1.96 
= 
107 Holabird Tax Parcels  
÷ 
235380 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
As with Carroll-Camden, the relatively small numbers of parcels may skew the 
analysis and make the location quotients unconvincing statistics.  Therefore, as detailed 
below, a broader control mechanism was applied.   
 
Citywide Control:  All Neighborhoods with Voluntary Cleanup Program Sites 
Compared to Neighborhoods without brownfields reuse sites  
To establish a second, more significant measure of control, location quotients 
were calculated for all of the neighborhoods that had a property enter Maryland’s VCP 
from 1996 (program inception) through December of 2006.   This control also serves as a 
means of determining investment activity that might have been influenced by brownfields 
reuse throughout the entire city.  The total number of building permit requests and the 
location quotients relevant to this data are shown in the following tables.   
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Table 9. All permit requests for neighborhoods containing a VCP applicant 
property (1996-2006) 
Neighborhood # Permits 
1995 
# Permits 
2001 
# Permits 
2007 
#Tax 
Parcels 
BALTIMORE HIGHLANDS 65 58 272 1065 
BARRE CIRCLE 15 68 9 162 
BRIDGEVIEW/GREENLAWN 53 36 38 743 
CANTON 409 2263 2602 5949 
CANTON INDUSTRIAL 75 71 215 250 
CARROLL PARK 10 9 26 7 
CHARLES VILLAGE 163 177 361 1648 
CARROLL-CAMDEN  58 63 65 195 
CURTIS BAY INDUSTRIAL 10 86 9 27 
FAIRFIELD AREA 85 78 62 516 
FELLS POINT 297 451 479 2196 
FRANKFORD 291 349 429 6669 
INNER HARBOR 374 505 569 806 
JONES FALLS AREA 14 99 33 50 
LOCUST POINT INDUST. 118 368 684 1180 
MID-TOWN BELVEDERE 124 110 221 1266 
OLIVER 163 76 481 2636 
ORANGEVILLE INDUST. 21 22 14 62 
PANWAY/BRADDISH AVE. 34 17 12 520 
PORT COVINGTON 3 4 12 31 
PULASKI INDUSTRIAL 93 59 66 313 
RIVERSIDE 439 857 1429 2793 
SHARP-LEADENHALL 41 51 105 320 
SHIPLEY HILL 61 36 107 1291 
SPRING GARDEN INDUST. 11 16 47 32 
UPPER FELLS POINT 166 539 849 1895 
WASHINGTON VILLAGE 276 155 1765 2705 
WESTPORT 168 67 129 609 
WOODBERRY 116 32 126 548 
Totals 3753 6847 11225 36484 
 
3753 VCP Nghbrhd Permits 22018 Citywide Permits 1995 
LQ 1.09  
= 
36484 Tax Parcels  
÷ 
233473 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
6847 VCP Nghbrhd Permits 20130 Citywide Permits 2001 
LQ 2.17  
= 
36484 Tax Parcels 
÷ 
233260 Citywide Tax Parcels 
 
11225 VCP Nghbrhd Permits 39327 Citywide Permits 2007 
LQ 2.26 
= 
36484 Tax Parcels 
÷ 
235380 Citywide Tax Parcels 
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Interpretation of Location Quotient (LQ) Data 
The researcher speculates that the activity surrounding the major brownfields 
(re)construction sites was a significant enough factor to inspire homeowners and 
contractors to invest heavily in the surrounding neighborhoods.  Unfortunately, the 
Carroll-Camden Industrial neighborhood has a relatively small number of residential tax 
parcels which makes analysis difficult.   The data show that the Carroll-Camden area had 
permit requests being applied for at a rate far greater than that of the entire city, but so 
did the control neighborhood, Holabird.  Nevertheless, permits filed in the Carroll-
Camden neighborhood did increase in each time-period.  Additionally, the rate at which 
Carroll-Camden permit activity was taking place was similar to all of the neighborhoods 
in the larger “all VCP neighborhood” control group in 2007.   This suggests that the 
neighborhood was settling into an investment pattern on par with other VCP 
neighborhoods and outpacing the rest of the city.  
Permit activity strongly suggests a significant increase in construction work being 
done in Locust Point; and the control datasets (Poppleton and All VCP neighborhoods) 
help to validate the location quotient methodology.  The building permit story for Locust 
Point is extremely pointed—the area went from an aver ge Baltimore neighborhood to 
one with over three times the activity of the city just as work was being done at Tide 
Point.  Consider the following: in 1995 Locust Point had a permit data LQ of 1.06, 
implying that the neighborhood was on par with the rest of the city.  In 2001, as 
construction vehicles were actively going to and from Tide Point, the surrounding 
neighborhood appeared to be equally busy with construction activity and permit requests 
outpaced the city over four-to-one with a LQ of 3.45.  In 2007 the neighborhood was still 
substantially outpacing Baltimore’s requests for permits and the LQ was 3.33.   
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The analysis is even more convincing when compared to the Poppleton 
neighborhood.  In 1995, Poppleton was reasonably consistent with the rest of Baltimore 
in permit requests as demonstrated with a nearly pa LQ of 0.82.  However, as building 
activity was skyrocketing in Locust Point investment rates were plummeting in Poppleton 
and the rate of building request dropped to an LQ of 0.40 in 2001 and 0.43 in 2007.   
Still, it is quite possible that the rate of permit requests for Locust Point may be an 
anomaly.   To control this possibility and determine f brownfields reuse was having an 
impact on permit requests in general, an aggregate of all neighborhoods with VCP 
applicants was compared to the entire city.  The results appear to justify that more 
investment at the neighborhood level corresponds to VCP applications.  Neighborhoods 
that had a VCP site were on par (LQ 1.09) with the city before the inception of MDE’s 
brownfields program.   (The LQ was nearly identical to Locust Point’s LQ of 1.06.)  
However, after the brownfields program was in place, neighborhoods with one or more 
VCP applicants outpaced the citywide rate of requests by a two-to-one ratio (2001 LQ= 
2.17 and 2007 LQ= 2.26).   While the majority of the VCP sites are located near 
Baltimore’s waterfront, the map on page 31 highlights t e fact that reuse projects are 
dispersed throughout the city.  This spatial distribution strengthens the hypothesis that the 
cleanup and reuse of brownfields helps to initiate nv stment in the surrounding 
neighborhood.   Also, the citywide control group helps substantiate the fact the Locust 
Point activity was not an anomaly, but rather a trend that closely followed the 
redevelopment of brownfields.    
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VI. CONCLUSION  
This thesis set out to answer two questions: 1) what are the relevant federal, state, 
and local brownfields policies and how are those policies implemented to bring about 
successful brownfields redevelopment?  And, 2) does successful brownfields 
redevelopment have a ripple effect and significantly reinvigorate surrounding 
neighborhoods, increase municipal ad valorem tax income and generally work toward the 
rejuvenation of an aging industrial city?  
What are the policies?  
The first query really has no “yes” or “no” quantifiable or qualifiable answer. 
Instead, the thesis has given an overview of nationl brownfields legislation and 
discussed the state level brownfields program in Maryland.  However, by analyzing how 
the brownfields policies were applied to the two case study sites, it has been possible to 
answer whether or not the programs were successful with rejuvenating at least portions of 
Baltimore.   
This research answered the policy question by putting into context the history of 
some of our nation’s most important environmental legislation. When identifying the true 
beginning of the American environmental movement and our nation’s first call for 
pollution regulations, environmentalists usually point to the first Earth Day celebrated on 
22 April 1970 (Mowrey and Redmond 1993).  As was outlined in Chapter III, however, it 
took many years to actually begin addressing idle industrial sites.  The first federal 
legislation addressing abandoned and contaminated lnd was not enacted until the 1980s 
and it took until the mid-1990s for truly effective policies to take hold at the state and 
federal levels.   
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Even though the policies took a long time to come about, the Brownfields 
Program at the USEPA and the brownfields provisions of Maryland’s Smart Growth 
Initiatives were eventually the real stimulus behind the development of sites such as 
Montgomery Park and Tide Point.  Because of the successful implementation of 
brownfields policies, it makes it possible to answer th  second thesis question and 
determine whether or not brownfields redevelopment truly helps restore an older 
industrial city.   
Does brownfields redevelopment work? 
The researcher has not been able to find other studie  analyzing permit data as a 
means of identifying increased economic investment in a neighborhood.  The researcher 
postulates that both tax valuations and sales data are lagging indicators of urban 
revitalization efforts while analysis of permit data captures economic investment as it 
happens.  In many instances homeowners may be increasing the values of their homes 
through permitted upgrades or remodeling, and generally improve the aesthetics of a 
neighborhood but not actually sell their homes.  Therefore, research looking only at sales 
records will not capture value increases.  Additionally, as previously indicated, cities do 
not appraise properties for tax purposes annually.  Baltimore is on a three year rotation 
and research looking to quantify rejuvenation efforts through tax records may miss the 
overall picture.  
 The strongest support for the theory that tax records do not capture rejuvenation 
efforts is the fact that both neighborhoods studied isplayed tax value drops in the years 
between 1995 and 2001.  However, many neighborhoods experienced significant 
increases in requests for permits—an indication that property owners in close proximity 
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to redevelopment sites were acknowledging the cleanup efforts and making investments 
into their own properties.  Therefore, it was a combination of permit data, location 
analysis of permit data, tax records, and sales data th t helped to answer the second major 
question of this thesis:  does successful brownfields redevelopment have a ripple effect 
and significantly reinvigorate surrounding neighborhoods, increase municipal ad valorem 
tax income and generally work toward the rejuvenation of an aging industrial city?   
 The answers found in this research are encouraging.  The neighborhoods have 
seen tremendous value increases and the permit records indicate a surge in construction 
investment.  Even though industrial properties are highly valued, transformation to mixed 
use brought about exponential tax assessment increases.  The research shows that both 
the case study sites were falling in value between 1995 and 2001.  Without the 
redevelopment, the downward trend might have continued and Baltimore’s tax base could 
have been devastated.  The combined site and neighborhood tax records are the final 
evidence that the brownfields policies and tax incentiv s are seemingly reinvigorating 
portions of the city and increasing ad valorem tax income. 
 In her article, Howland (2003) found that Baltimore brownfields projects that 
involved high levels of public subsidy and profuse levels of local government input were 
less likely to be considered “successful” projects. Of the sites Howland compared, the 
“least successful” site involving the most city input, was located in a very depressed and 
crime-ridden neighborhood.  Work began on the site well before the development of the 
USEPA Brownfields Program in 1995 and years before Maryland’s brownfields 
initiatives of 1997.  Evidently the developers, a national residential builder, walked away 
from the project before constructing a single home; hence Howland’s label as a “failed” 
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development.  Howland’s most successful case study site was located in a desirable 
downtown area, only a few blocks from Baltimore’s famed “Inner Harbor” and 
redevelopment started after the inception of both the USEPA and Maryland brownfields 
programs.  (Note: Under the direction of a new develop r, construction resumed on the 
“failed” site in 2004.  Upper price-range attached single family residential units now 
occupy the former brownfield site.  The renewed success of the property may have 
something to do with its close proximity to the Oriole’s baseball park… another former 
brownfield site.) 
It is true that the neighborhood around Montgomery Park did not have the swell 
of new permit activity witnessed in the area around Tide Point—a fact that supports 
Howland’s (2003) findings.  After all, Montgomery Park did need a myriad of public 
subsidies and the neighborhood is still not necessarily booming.  On the other hand, the 
site is now a workplace for thousands of Marylanders and the construction methods had 
tremendous benefits to the environment.  The green oof, waterless urinals, and recycled 
water toilets are helping restore the water quality in the nearby Chesapeake Bay, and the 
urban location likely helps to reduce vehicle miles traveled and undoubtedly helped 
preserve undeveloped Maryland greenspace from another new office complex. One 
brownfields statistic states that for every one acre of brownfield site redeveloped, four 
and one half acres of greenfields are preserved (Deason et al. 2001).  If that holds true for 
the sixteen-plus acre Montgomery Park, seventy-four acres of Maryland remains green.    
The Tide Point developers took advantage of only a few public subsidy programs.  
But the Struever Bros did capitalize on the lucrative Historic Tax Credits and 
Brownfields Tax Credits offered at the time in Maryl nd, and just as with Montgomery 
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Park, the project would not have gotten off the ground without the creation of Maryland’s 
VCP. In reality, the two projects appeared to rely heavily on both the VCP and the 
historic tax credits; the main difference between the successes seems to be the fact that 
each project needed one more (very different) ingredient.  For Montgomery Park to be 
redeveloped it took substantial local, state, and federal grants and loans.  For Tide Point, 
the real estate anecdote of “location, location, location” came into play and the developer 
recognized that waterfront real estate would be highly sought after, regardless of 
neighboring land uses. 
 Projects like Montgomery Park and Tide Point have likely contributed to 
significant change to the character and economics of Baltimore.  Along with the dozens 
of construction cranes once again present in the city’s skyline, it is not uncommon to see 
newspaper and business journal articles favorably describing the city’s potential for 
business.  An example from the Baltimore Business Journal notes, “ Baltimore is 
changing. It's economic base has shifted from its blue collar, industrial roots to 
knowledge-based jobs in fields including financial services and biotechnology (Sernovitz 
2007, 1).” 
In every census count since 1950 Baltimore has lost residents while the state of 
Maryland has gained population (Planning 2000).  However, quality revitalization efforts 
are reversing the trend and inspiring a resurgence of urban living and this movement is 
not unique to Baltimore.  Other aging industrial cities fortunate to have creative and 
environmentally minded developers are enjoying a new-found urban vibrancy (Vey 2007; 
Leinberger 2007).   Both in Baltimore and on the national scene developers are becoming 
less fearful of brownfield sites and bankers are increasingly more willing to finance 
  
 - 82 - 
projects located on brownfields.  The following statements from a recent planning journal 
describe the current climate of brownfields redevelopment: 
Originally, many developers and lenders were wary of taking on these 
properties, because of liability issues and question  of expense. But now 
developers and others can see projects that have been completed, and buy 
insurance policies that limit liability, and so are more comfortable working 
with these properties…  According to Environmental D ta Resources, 
which aggregates and sells environmental information about specific 
properties to developers, lenders and other groups, 52 percent of survey 
respondents said the pace of brownfield redevelopment is increasing; 47 
percent said it is stable (Dawkins 2007, 1) 
 
 Statements like these substantiate the fact that the policy changes of the past two 
decades are working and the scars of America’s industrial legacy are finally healing. 
Today, if they exercise diligence, developers can redevelop land without fear of 
litigation. Recent consumer preference research estimated that thirty to forty percent of 
Americans want walkable urbanism, but throughout the last half century the nation’s 
primary infrastructure investment has been in new lo -density suburb development 
rather than land recycling and infill development (Leinberger 2007).  In other words, a 
huge sector of the public wants to live and work in urban areas, but decades of litigation 
and lending practices stymied reuse and infill projects. The transformations of 
Montgomery Park and Tide Point were not chance occurrences.  It took aggressive public 
policy to overcome the stigma associated with industrial properties and today the sites fill 
the wants and needs of thousands of Marylanders.  Finally, not only have the sites 
become urban workplaces, the redevelopment projects are aving valuable undeveloped 
lands and restoring prosperity to Baltimore.  Around Montgomery Park and Tide Point 
the blight and abandonment are gone and the neighborhoods are being transformed and 
rejuvenated; these are two examples of great restoration efforts in an aging industrial city. 
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In summary, this thesis demonstrates that creative financing and tax incentive 
packages instituted in Maryland in the mid-to-late 1990’s were essential to bring about 
brownfields reuse projects.  Quantitative analysis of neighborhood investment, tax 
values, and real estate transactions help to demonstrate that the incentive packages have 
been invaluable to the city of Baltimore by reversing abandonment trends and 
significantly adding to the city’s tax base.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
 The type of research completed in this thesis could, and perhaps should, be 
replicated in other cities to help understand the rol of brownfields reuse in restoring 
prosperity to communities weakened by abandoned facilities.  The location quotient is 
powerful tool that easily highlights how the areas surrounding a redevelopment site are 
influenced in relation to the rest of a city or metropolitan area.   Further use of the 
location quotient could help to compare many other factors useful in determining the 
success of a brownfield redevelopment project.  Forexample, did employment rates in 
the neighborhood change in comparison to the rest of the city? Or, was there a change in 
homeownership rates in the neighborhood that outpaced citywide ownership rates? 
 In addition to calculating location quotients for more factors, further research 
should analyze more years.  Unfortunately, building permit data for the years prior to 
2004 is not available on-line from Baltimore’s Housing Department, and obtaining data 
from 1995 and 2001 was complex and time consuming.   However, despite the challenges 
with obtaining massive datasets from city offices, charting annual changes at the 
neighborhood level would alleviate outliers of “boom” or “bust” time periods within the 
city’s various neighborhoods.  It might also be helpful to separate the quantitative 
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analysis by property type.  For example, the resident al data could be separated from 
commercial data to help determine if more business-r lated versus home-buying activity 
was taking place in a given area. In short, while this hesis begins to shed light on the 
positive impacts of brownfields redevelopment, analysis of more datasets could further 
explain if reuse programs are truly revitalizing America’s older industrial cities. 
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